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PRECAUTIONARY CASH SAVINGS AND EQUITY ISSUANCES – EUROPEAN 
EVIDENCE 
 
PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
The purpose of this study is to analyze the role of precautionary cash holding motive in explaining 
increased cash ratios within European firms during period 1995 – 2010. Financial literature 
discusses the explanatory role of several cash holding motives but recently it has been especially 
the precautionary motive that has received the strongest support among practitioners. Whereas 
firms have both internal and external sources for cash, in this study I investigate which of these 
sources has been the most common source for cash savings. Moreover, the role of equity issuances 
– and their interaction between precautionary motives – is examined empirically in detail.  
DATA 
The data used in the study consists of active and non-active public companies within EU15 
countries. Due to their distinctive nature, utilities and companies in financial sector are excluded 
from the sample. Time period for study is 1995 – 2010 and additional sub-period of 1995 – 2006 is 
also widely used in order to exclude the effects of recent financial crisis from time trend tests. 
Primary source for data is Thomson ONE Banker Worldscope database. The final sample includes 
a total of 41,144 firm-year observations.  
RESULTS 
I find evidence on significantly increased cash ratios for sample firms during period 1995 – 2006 
and that there is a clear positive connection between the scope of precautionary motives and cash 
holdings. Together with increasing cash holding, firms have not increased their leverage 
correspondingly which has led to decreased net debt levels for the sample. I further conclude that 
increase in cash ratios is mainly financed with equity issuances as they are by far the main source 
for cash savings when compared to other alternatives. Finally, and most importantly, empirical 
tests show that within-firm increase in precautionary motives cause within-firm increase in the 
amount of cash saved from equity issuances. 
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SUOJAAVAT KASSAVARANNOT JA OSAKEANNIT – TUTKIMUS 
EUROOPPALAISISTA YRITYKSISTÄ 
 
TUTKIELMAN TAVOITTEET 
Tämän tutkielman tavoitteena on tutkia, kuinka motiivi pitää suojaavia käteisvarantoja pystyy 
selittämään kasvaneita kassasuhteita eurooppalaisten yritysten taseissa vuosien 1995 – 2010 aikana. 
Aihetta käsittelevä kirjallisuus on aiemmin tunnistanut useita eri motiiveja selittämään sopivan 
kassasuhteen määräytymistä, mutta viime aikoina erityisesi suojaavan käteisvarannon motiivi on 
saanut eniten tukea aihetta käsittelevissä artikkeleissa. Lisäksi tärkeänä tutkimuskysymyksenä on, 
mistä rahoituslähteistä saamiaan käteisvaroja yritykset käyttävät tavallisimmin kasvattaakseen 
käteisenä rahana olevia säästöjään. Tutkimuksen kannalta oleellisimpia tavoitteita on selvittää, 
säästävätkö yritykset enemmän osakeanneista saamistaan tuotoista silloin kuin yritysten motiivit 
kasvattaa suojaavia käteisvarojaan kasvavat.  
LÄHDEAINEISTO 
Tutkimuksessa käytetty lähdeaineisto koostuu aktiivisista ja ei-aktiivisista listatuista EU15-maiden 
yrityksistä. Julkiset laitokset ja rahoituslaitokset on jätetty tutkimuksen ulkopuolelle. Empiirisen 
tutkimuksen aikajakso sisältää vuodet 1995–2010 ja lisäksi lyhyempää jaksoa 1995–2006 on myös 
käytetty poistamaan edellisen finanssikriisin vaikutukset trenditesteistä. Ensisijainen lähde 
havainnoille on Thomson ONE Banker Worldscope – tietokanta. Näiden rajoitusten myötä 
lähdeaineiston koko on 41,144 yritys-vuosi-havaintoa.  
TULOKSET 
Löydän tukea oletukselle, jonka mukaan yritykset of merkittävästi kasvattaneet kassasuhteitaan 
vuosien 1995–2006 aikana, ja että yritykset joilla on suurempi motiivi pitää suojaavia käteisvaroja 
myös tekevät näin. Vaikka yritykset ovat selvästi kasvattaneet kassojaan, velan määrä ei ole 
kasvanut vastaavassa määrin ja tämän seurauksena aineistossa olevien yritysten nettovelka on 
pienentynyt tutkitulla aikavälillä. Lisäksi totean, että osakeannit ovat merkittävin lähde kasvaneille 
käteissäästöille, sillä muiden lähteiden rooli kassan kasvattamiseen on selkeästi osakeanteja 
pienempi. Lopuksi, tutkimuksen kannalta tärkeimpiä tuloksiani on todeta, että suojaavan 
käteisvarantomotiivin kasvaessa yritykset myös kasvattavat osakeanneista saatujen tuottojen 
säästämistä.  
AVAINSANAT 
Suojaavat käteisvarannot, kassasuhde, osakeannit 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Firms need to have a sufficient level of cash at all times in order to keep their operations 
running. The definition of sufficient level is, however, probably different for each firm, 
industry and even country. Therefore, different kinds of motives for cash holdings must be 
influencing the decisions to hold cash as its most liquid form instead of investing it at a better 
return. Different main motives have been a topic in economics literature already since Keynes 
(1936) who presented the transaction motive and precautionary motive to better explain the 
rationale behind certain firm´s cash ratio. More recently, for example tax and agency theories 
have been constructed to create more comprehensive framework for cash holding decisions. 
Whatever the motive, there has been significant increase in cash ratios during last few decades 
(see Bates, Kahle and Stulz, 2009).  
Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz and Williamson (1999) show in their widely cited study that highest 
cash ratios are held by firms with strong growth opportunities and volatile cash flows. More 
recently, Bates, Kahle and Stulz (2009) show that U.S. companies have doubled their cash 
ratios during the time period 1980 – 2006. Adding to research by Opler et al., Bates, Kahle 
and Stulz conclude that the increase in cash holding seems to be the highest for firms with 
high R&D expenditures, high idiosyncratic industry risk and for non-dividend payers. All 
these features refer to increase in precautionary motives, i.e. firms need to save higher levels 
of cash in order to prepare themselves against unexpected costs and investments in the future. 
Accordingly, if firms have not taken precautionary actions into account, they might be unable 
to take positive-NPV investments, keep their product development running or even face 
difficulties to meet their liabilities. Because increase in precautionary motives has received 
the strongest support in explaining the increased cash holdings recently, it receives the main 
focus in this thesis as well. 
As firms seem to hold more cash on their balance sheets as they used to, it is interesting to 
investigate the sources where these additional cash savings are retrieved from. One reason 
could be that firms are more profitable than before, and consequently, they are able to put 
more cash aside from their increased cash flows. Or, they might be more willing or more 
solvent to take additional debt and save the proceeds from debt issuances. Moreover, these 
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alternatives would be the ones that firms would prefer according to traditional pecking order 
theory. However, as recently investigated by McLean (2011), firms tend to issue equity in 
order to increase their cash holdings. Moreover, McLean points out that share issuance – cash 
savings are further motivated due to decreased internal cash flows and stable leverage levels 
within U.S. companies. 
McLean (2011) presents an interesting theory about share issuances. First, share issuances 
seem to be main source for cash savings. Second, increase in precautionary motives is 
correlated with increase in equity issuances. And third, cash savings instead of investments or 
capital restructurings are stated to be the main motivation to issue equity in the first place. 
Therefore, study by McLean presents a fresh perspective for cash holdings and share issuance 
literature, thus creating new research questions for further study. By combining the recent 
studies by Bates, Kahle and Stulz (2009) and McLean (2011), I construct a theoretical 
framework for investigating whether precautionary motives have been driving the increase in 
cash ratios and whether these potential cash increases are mainly financed by share issuances 
or by other cash sources. I contribute to above mentioned research papers by conducting 
empirical tests in European context and including recent financial crisis to primary sample. 
Hence, results retrieved in the empirical part of this thesis report whether findings made by 
prior literature can be generalized when several countries with different characteristics are 
included to research. 
 
1.1. Research Objectives  
 
My research objective is to test the main findings made by Bates, Kahle and Stulz (2009) and 
McLean (2011) using European dataset. First two research questions presented in this section 
are hence targeted to examine the basis for further study, i.e. by investigating the potential 
increase in cash holdings and possible relation between precautionary motives and cash 
holdings. Three last research questions focus more on McLean’s findings by investigating the 
role of share issuances as source for cash savings and their relation to precautionary motives. 
Objectives of my empirical work aim to find answers for research questions presented next.  
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1. Are European firms holding more cash and are they more leveraged than they used 
to? 
All else equal, dramatic development of information and financial technology during last 30 
years should have led to a reduction in corporate cash holdings. Firms can hedge their cash 
flows and positions more and more efficiently as more types of derivatives have become 
available. This in turn should have led to lower precautionary demand for cash. However, in 
presence of e.g. agency theory, taxes and potential changes in firm characteristics, the demand 
function for cash is more complex. Bates, Kahle and Stulz (2009) show that U.S. firms have 
more than doubled their cash ratios since the beginning of 1980s. They argue that this 
increase is mainly due to increased precautionary motives for cash holdings. My aim is to 
show that similar kind of increasing trend in cash ratios is present for European firms as well.  
Moreover, as cash has important implications for the understanding of the firm’s leverage, I 
argue that average net debt within my sample has decreased and this is due to increased cash 
holdings, not because of decreased debt holdings.  
2. Is there relation between cash holdings and precautionary motives?   
The second question focuses on precautionary motive and its relation to cash holdings. Opler, 
Pinkowitz, Stulz and Williamson (1999); and Bates, Kahle and Stulz (2009) use three 
measures for precautionary motives, arguing that firms with high industry cash flow volatility, 
high R&D expenditures and low dividend payments face highest motives to hold 
precautionary cash savings. In addition to these three proxies, McLean (2011) constructs a 
first principal component from cash flow volatility, R&D and dividends in order to capture 
the precautionary component of these proxies to one index. In order to bring support for the 
precautionary motive theory, I strive to show that firms with higher precautionary motives 
have higher cash ratios.  
3. What internal and external cash sources firms are using for cash savings? 
Third question relates to different cash sources and firms’ propensity to save cash proceeds 
from different cash sources. I use similar regression equation used by Kim and Weisbach 
(2008), Hertzel and Li (forthcoming), and McLean (2011) in order to investigate the savings 
rates for each cash sources that are available for a firm to raise cash from. Cash sources are 
divided to internal cash flows, i.e. cash flow from operations and cash flow from non-
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operational activities, and to external cash sources, i.e. debt and equity issuances. The 
objective in this thesis is to show that, correspondingly to McLean (2011), share issuances are 
the main source for cash savings.  
4. Is there a relation between precautionary motives and amount of cash saved from 
share issuances? 
 
Question 4 combines the results from previous research questions. If precautionary motives 
have explanatory power on cash changes, and share issuances are the main cash source for 
cash savings, then it might be possible that within-firm changes in precautionary motives can 
cause within-firm changes in cash savings from share issuances. McLean (2011) reports that 
each precautionary motive measure affects within-firm decisions to issue shares for cash 
savings. By using firm- and year-fixed regression model as in McLean, the objective in my 
thesis is to show that changes in within-firm precautionary motives: cash flow volatility, R&D 
expenditures, dividend payments, and their overall effect, cause changes in within-firm 
savings from share issuances.  
5. Are shares primarily issued for investment purposes or for cash savings? 
 
Final question discusses the primary motivation for share issuances. Kim and Weisbach 
(2008) conclude that one motivation for equity issuances is to finance R&D and capital 
expenditures, but they find also strong support for market timing, meaning that firms issue 
equity in order to take advantage of favorable market valuation. McLean (2011) on the other 
hand challenges the market timing theory as a motivation for equity issuances. This is because 
he does not find a positive relation between cash savings from share issuances and 
overvaluation, and hence McLean divides share issuance motives to investment and cash 
savings motives. The aim in this paper is to test whether share issuances are primarily 
motivated by cash savings or is investment motive a more common driver for issuing equity.  
 
1.2. Scope and Limitations of the Thesis  
 
The sample used in this thesis is limited by geography, time and company status. Research 
includes only publicly listed companies that are registered to some EU15 country. Moreover, 
financial companies and utilities are excluded from the research due to their specific nature, 
5 
 
different accounting practices, and potential government control. Time period under 
investigation includes years from 1995 to 2010, thus including also years of recent financial 
crisis that ignited in 2007. Due to abnormal time period of 2007 – 2010 at the end of sample 
period, I additionally use widely a sub-period of 1995 – 2006 in order to research my 
hypotheses within normal economic conditions. Sample observations are received from 
financial statements data. In order to include a company in the final sample, it needs to have 
data in the Thomson ONE Banker’s Worldscope database which is the primary data source 
used in this thesis.  
This thesis mainly follows and combines most of the main findings in two recent studies by 
Bates, Kahle and Stulz (2009) and McLean (2011). However, the scope of research focuses 
on precautionary motives theory in explaining corporate cash holdings. Therefore, for 
instance, agency theory and market timing theory that have not received as much support in 
these two papers are left out from the empirical part of this thesis. In addition, the potential 
relation between precautionary motives and share issuance - cash savings is emphasized. 
Hence, the interaction between debt issuances and precautionary motives is not empirically 
investigated.  
 
1.3. Main Findings 
 
I report that European firms have clearly increased their cash holdings during period 1995 - 
2010. Increase has been the strongest for smallest firms, non-dividend payers, and for 
negative-income firms. In addition, firms that have high precautionary motives have increased 
their cash holdings more than firms with low precautionary motives. I further show that 
during the same period firms have kept their leverage levels at steady levels on average, and 
therefore increased cash holdings have pushed net debt levels down from the level in 1995.  
When comparing different internal and external cash sources, I find evidence that share 
issuances have been the main source for cash savings. Moreover, equity issuance is the only 
cash source that has significantly increasing time trend in cash savings during the sample 
period. Therefore, I conclude that the increase in cash holdings is mainly financed with 
external equity. As firms seem to save a large portion of their share issuance proceeds, I 
investigate whether cash savings is the main motivation for issuances over the investment 
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motivation. Empirical tests bring more support for the cash savings motivation, and therefore 
investments seem to be only the secondary motivation for raising external equity. 
The most important empirical tests in the thesis examine the interaction between 
precautionary motives and savings from share issuances. When running a regression with 
firm- and year-fixed effects, I find that within-firm increases in precautionary motives lead to 
within-firm increases in share issuance – cash savings. Thus, the main conclusion is that 
precautionary motives have significant effect on the amount of cash saved from share 
issuance proceeds.  
 
1.4. Structure of the Thesis 
 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the literature about cash holding 
motives and theory around share issuances. Section 3 discusses the hypotheses of the study. 
Section 4 describes data sample and main variables. Section 5 discusses the main 
methodology used in empirical part. Section 6 presents the results from empirical tests and 
regressions, and Section 7 concludes. 
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
In this section, I review the most relevant academic research influencing the theoretical 
framework of this study. First, I focus on cash holding motives in Section 2.1., in which 
research papers investigating transaction, precautionary, tax, and agency motives for cash 
holdings are introduced. From the viewpoint of my study, precautionary motives are in the 
core of investigation and other motives are left outside the empirical scope of this thesis. 
Therefore, I stress that also other motives have been argued to have strong evidence in 
explaining cash holding decisions but precautionary motive was selected to detailed 
investigation due to the recent focus it has received by academic literature. Second, Section 
2.2. reviews academic literature about share issuance theories. Specifically, the Modigliani-
Miller (MM) theory, trade-off theory, pecking order theory, managerial entrenchment theory, 
market timing theory and precautionary share issuances theory are introduced. Again, 
precautionary share issuances theory is emphasized in later parts of my study as I empirically 
investigate the connection between development of precautionary motives and their influence 
on share issuance cash – savings in Section 6 of this thesis. 
 
2.1. Motives for Cash Holdings 
 
The first part of literature review introduces the main theories for cash holding motives. Next 
sub-sections review research papers that have been widely cited within the context of 
transaction motive, precautionary motive, tax motive, and agency motive, respectively.  
 
2.1.1. The Transaction Motive 
 
Probably the most obvious reason for cash holdings is the transaction motive. It is beneficial 
for a firm to be able to pay transactions in time and take advantage of possible cash discounts 
included in terms of certain transactions. Keynes (1936) was the first one to distinguish 
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different motives for cash holding. He names transaction motive
1
, precautionary motive and 
speculative motive (which will not be discussed here) as the main reasons in explaining the 
need for cash. According to transaction motive, firms (and individuals as well) hold cash in 
order to bridge the interval between the time of incurring business costs and that of the receipt 
of the sale proceeds. Furthermore, transaction motive holds strongly if cash holding is 
associated with cheaper transaction costs than financial non-cash assets (Keynes, 1936). 
Baumol (1952) was among the first practitioners to analyze the rational level of cash balances 
by constructing a simple model for transactions’ demand for cash at a minimal cost. His 
contribution was to integrate inventory theory to monetary theory because cash is similar to 
an inventory of a commodity in a sense that it can be given up at the appropriate moment, 
serving as its holder´s part of the bargain in an exchange. Furthermore, in his framework, 
transaction motive is named as a reason for holding cash in the first place because holding all 
liquid assets e.g. as short-term loans have always some transaction costs (“broker fee”) in case 
they need to be transformed to cash.  Baumol’s study created grounding for more complex 
and realistic models that are better applicable for business firms with highly volatile needs for 
cash in different periods (see e.g. Miller and Orr, 1966).  
A more recent empirical study by Shleifer and Vishny (1993) shows that transaction motive 
can affect the cash holdings decisions depending on the structure of a firm´s balance sheet. 
Accordingly, a firm with fewer liquid and easily sellable assets might have higher cash ratio 
because it might be unable to sell assets in order to meet the requirements of the creditor. 
However, in case of financial distress the firm would have other alternatives as well; it could 
try to reschedule its debt, or raise new equity. In a context of transaction motive, however, the 
alternative of asset sales has again the factor of transaction costs included. Furthermore, 
agency conflicts can cause transaction costs when owners of the company don’t see new 
investment as profitable as the management does. In this case, it would be too costly for the 
management to raise new equity to finance the investments and consequently higher level of 
cash is held on the balance sheet (see Myers and Majluf, 1984). 
 
 
 
                                                 
1
 Keynes further divides transaction motive to income motive and business motive. 
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2.1.2. The Precautionary Motive 
 
As mentioned in previous section, Keynes (1936) was the first one to introduce the definition 
for precautionary motive. According to his argument, cash is held in order to prepare for 
unexpected costs or investment opportunities. Furthermore, cash fixes the value of transaction 
in money terms as the corresponding liability is set on fixed money terms as well. More 
recent literature has investigated from many perspectives on how precautionary motives 
influence on cash balance decisions within a sample of fundamentally different kinds of firms. 
Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz and Williamson (1999) show strong evidence for precautionary cash 
holdings as their study concludes true some of the most general assumptions around the 
theory within. First, firms with strong growth opportunities, firms with riskier cash flows and 
small firms hold higher cash-to-assets ratios than other firms. Second, large firms and firms 
with high quality credit ratings that have the best ability to access capital markets, tend to 
have smaller cash ratios than other firms. Finally, precautionary motive receives strong 
support from the fact that management of a firm accumulates excess cash whenever it has the 
possibility to do so.  
Precautionary motive is also concluded to be influencing strongly on increased cash ratios 
during the last few decades (see Bates, Kahle and Stulz, 2009). Bates, Kahle and Stulz show 
that the average cash-to-assets ratio more than doubles for U.S. industrial firms during the 
time period 1980 – 2006. Increase in cash ratios is the largest for firms that do not pay 
dividends, firms that have recently gone public and firms within industries that experience the 
highest increase in idiosyncratic volatility. Main reasons for increased cash ratios are 
explained by fallen inventory levels, increased cash flow risk, decreased capital expenditures 
and increased R&D expenditures
2
. In general, three proxies are widely used to measure 
precautionary motives: R&D expenditures, industry cash flow volatility and dividends (see 
e.g. Opler et al, 1999 and Bates, Kahle and Stulz, 2009). In addition, an index of the three 
proxies mentioned is used in McLean (2011). Bates, Kahle and Stulz conclude that change in 
firm characteristics explains the increased cash ratios over the sample period and that 
precautionary motive to hold cash is a critical determinant of the demand for cash.  
                                                 
2
 Inventory as part of net working capital substitutes for cash, thus having negative relation between cash; cash 
flow risk increases the motive to hold more cash in case of adverse cash flows; capital expenditures create assets 
that can act as a collateral and thus they could increase debt capacity and decrease demand on cash; R&D 
measure growth opportunities and also, R&D expenditures are usually kept smooth with high cash ratios (see 
e.g. Brown and Petersen, 2011). 
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2.1.3. The Tax Motive 
 
A more recent research among motives for cash holdings is based on the tax motive. The tax 
motive refers to lack of incentives to repatriate earnings from foreign subsidiaries and 
businesses. Foley, Hartzell, Titman and Twite (2007) discuss that most U.S. affiliates’ taxes 
are equal to the difference between foreign income taxes paid and tax payments that would be 
due if foreign earnings were taxed at the U.S. rate, and they can be deferred until earnings are 
repatriated. Therefore, U.S. multinational corporations are better off by retaining earnings 
abroad and hold them as cash if there are no rational investment opportunities on sight. Main 
empirical findings in Foley et al. (2007) are that 1) U.S. multinationals that would perceive 
highest tax consequences by repatriating foreign earnings have higher cash balances, 2) and 
affiliates in countries with lowest tax rates hold more cash than other affiliates of the same 
parent company.  
In their study, Bates, Kahle and Stulz (2009) also look into the tax motive and empirically 
compare if there have been significant differences between the change in cash holdings of 
companies with no foreign income and companies that do have foreign earnings. They 
conclude that findings in Foley et al. (2007) can’t explain the increase in cash ratios, as there 
is no difference between the increase in cash holdings among firms with foreign income and 
firms without foreign income. Instead, while the average cash ratio increases from 14.3% to 
25.3% during time period of 1980 – 2006 for firms without foreign taxable income, the cash 
ratio for firms with taxable foreign income increases from 10.8% in 1990 to 20.2% in 2006 
3
 
(see Bates, Kahle and Stulz  2009). Thus, increase in tax motive does not seem to be the 
reason behind increased cash ratios. 
 
2.1.4. The Agency Motive 
 
Agency theories are widely investigated in corporate financial literature and agency problems 
as motive for greater cash holdings has been discussed and studied initially by Jensen (1986). 
The motives of management and shareholders might differ, and in the context of cash 
                                                 
3
 Towards the end of sample period, U.S. firms were allowed to repatriate cash held in foreign countries at a 
lower tax rate in order to decrease negative incentives to repatriate cash from foreign affiliates (Bates et al. 
2009). 
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holdings, managers might want to retain high cash balances on firm’s balance sheet although 
it would be more beneficial for shareholders to pay out the extra cash as dividends. According 
to Jensen (1986), conflicts of interest between shareholders and managers over payout 
policies are especially severe when the organization generates substantial free cash flow. 
Consequently, extra cash might lead to managerial inefficiencies if management decides to 
invest the free cash flow to projects with negative net present values. Therefore, within this 
framework, firms with the highest agency problems would have higher cash ratios. 
More recent studies have empirically tested Jensen´s hypotheses and agency motive has 
received strong support from many practitioners. Dittmar, Mahrt-Smith and Servaes (2003) 
have investigated a wide data set from 45 countries to conclude that firms doing business in 
countries with poor investor protection and high level of agency problems have significantly 
higher cash holdings compared to countries where agency problems are of less importance. 
Pinkowitz, Stulz and Williamson (2003) are in line with Dittmar et al. (2003) and contribute 
by examining the dollar value of cash in countries with different levels of investor protection. 
Again, Pinkowitz et al. (2003) is consistent with agency theory and conclude that a dollar 
value of cash in countries with poor investor protection (and high level of agency problems) is 
only about 65% of the dollar value of cash in countries with good protection of investor 
rights.  
However, from the point of view of increased cash ratios, Bates, Kahle and Stulz (2009) don’t 
find evidence that increase in agency motive could explain higher cash ratios. Accordingly, 
they don´t find empirical support for the argument that cash ratios would increase more for 
firms with higher agency problems or that value of cash would fall during their sample period 
1980 - 2006. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
12 
 
2.2. Share Issuances and Capital Structure 
 
The second part of literature review deals with share issuance motives and their context 
within capital structure decisions. Especially, research papers discussing the Modigliani-
Miller theory, trade-off theory, pecking order theory, managerial entrenchment theory, market 
timing theory, and precautionary share issuances theory are reviewed in next sections.  
 
2.2.1. The Modigliani-Miller Theory 
 
In order to describe an overview about share issuance motives, the original and heavily 
simplified capital structure theory by Modigliani and Miller
4
 (1958) can’t be bypassed. M-M 
presented four propositions in order to create a theory discussing decisions about capital 
structure and shareholder value. Proposition 1 suggests that the value of a firm is the same 
regardless of whether it finances itself with debt or equity, but the rate of return on equity 
grows linearly with the debt ratio (or leverage) in Proposition 2. Proposition 3 presents the 
irrelevance of dividend policy as the assumption is that the distribution of dividends does not 
change firm’s market value. Finally, Proposition 4 suggests that in order to decide an 
investment, a firm should expect a rate of return at least equal to the weighted average cost of 
capital, no matter where the finance would come from.  
As such, M-M is a framework that was presented in order to create a starting point for further 
study. Thus, the assumptions in M-M were not realistic and therefore the framework has been 
widened in order to construct empirical studies with real-life elements that were lacking in M-
M. The most common elements that are used in order to fix the failures in M-M include 
variables such as taxes, transaction costs, bankruptcy costs, agency conflicts, adverse 
selection, lack of separability between financing and operations, time-varying financial 
market opportunities, and investor clientele effects (Frank and Goyal, 2007). 
 
                                                 
4
 The study by Modigliani and Miller (1958) is widely referred to with abbreviation M-M in economic literature. 
I use also this abbreviation in this thesis.  
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2.2.2. Trade-off Theory 
 
The M-M theorem and especially the addition of corporate tax shields in the model 
(Modigliani and Miller, 1963) worked as a trigger for trade-off theory. This is because, 
according to M-M, the optimal capital structure would include 100% of debt and no equity 
because tax shield was presented but no offsetting costs of debt (Frank and Goyal, 2007). A 
firm financed entirely with debt is definitely more probable to face bankruptcy costs 
compared to otherwise similar firm with no debt.  
The trade-off theory asserts that a firm’s security issuance decisions move its capital structure 
toward an optimum that is determined by a trade-off between the marginal costs (bankruptcy 
and agency costs) and benefits (debt tax shields and reduction of free cash flow problems) of 
debt (Dittmar and Thakor, 2007). Therefore, firms ought to have an optimal capital structure 
that it actively maintains by debt and share issuances whenever needed. In this context, firms 
that face decreasing share price perceive effectively an increase in leverage ratio, and this 
should in turn lead to a share issuance.  
Empirical studies have not found supporting evidence for trade-off theory. This is mainly 
because firms are proven to issue equity rather than debt when stock prices are high and not 
the other way around as suggested in trade-off theory (see e.g. Baker and Wurgler, 2002).  
 
2.2.3. Pecking Order Theory 
 
Pecking order theory was constructed after it was early noticed that the explanatory power of 
trade-off theory was concluded to be low in empirical studies. As described in Myers (1984), 
unlike the trade-off theory suggests there is no optimal capital structure in the pecking order 
theory. Moreover, Myers notes that the crucial difference between pecking order theory and 
the static trade-off theory is that, in the modified pecking order story, observed debt ratios 
will reflect the cumulative requirement for external financing which has cumulated over an 
extended period. 
In Myers and Majluf (1984), managers are assumed to have the best perception of the firm’s 
true value, which is actually the case in real life as well. Due to this fact, rational investors 
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discount the value of firm’s stock price when managers decide to issue equity instead of debt. 
Therefore, managers avoid equity issuances whenever possible in order to avoid the discount 
in firm’s stock price. As a conclusion and according to pecking order theory, firms prefer 
internal funds, then risky debt and finally equity as a source for investments. Moreover, if 
there are no positive NPV investments on sight, firms tend to retain profits and in this way 
build financial slack in order to avoid the need for external financing in the future.  
Also pecking order theory has gained a lot of controversial discussion from practitioners 
mainly because firms seem to issue equity even though they would have the possibility to use 
internal funds or debt instead (see e.g. Baker and Wurgler, 2002). Myers (1984) suggests that 
high growth firms reduce leverage in order to avoid raising equity in the future when new 
investment opportunities arise. Therefore, the primary source for reducing leverage would be 
to retain earnings and in this way to increase the equity in the balance sheet. However, Baker 
and Wurgler show that firms with high market-to-book ratios reduce leverage through issuing 
equity, not by retaining earnings. Moreover, unlike suggested in Myers (1984), leverage 
seems to be much more dependent by past values of market-to-book instead of future 
investment opportunities (see Baker and Wurgler, 2002). 
 
2.2.4. Managerial Entrenchment Theory 
 
According to the definition by Weisbach (1988), managerial entrenchment occurs when 
managers gain so much power that they are able to use the firm to supplement their own 
interests rather than the interests of shareholders. In presence of high managerial 
entrenchment, capital structure decisions are motivated mostly by the interests of the 
managers instead of optimizing the value for shareholders. 
 Zwiebel (1996) constructs a dynamic theory of capital structure based on managerial 
entrenchment. In this model managers decide on optimal capital structure in the beginning of 
each period with the motivation to enable empire-building, and with the restriction that the 
firm does not become an attractive target for takeovers. Therefore, debt restricts managers 
through the threat of bankruptcy that is the most unwanted outcome for entrenched managers. 
However, managers find it useful to employ debt while it serves as a voluntary self-constraint 
which allows managers to avoid control challenges (Zwiebel, 1996). 
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In a sense, managerial entrenchment theory resembles market timing theory, which is 
discussed in the next section. As discussed in Baker and Wurgler (2002), in the context of 
dynamic theory of capital structure based on managerial entrenchment, equity finance is seen 
practical in case of high firm valuations and good investment opportunities, but at the same it 
allows managers to become entrenched. Further, entrenched managers may be unwilling to 
rebalance the capital structure by issuing debt in later periods which in turn is harmful for 
original shareholders who face the decreased return on invested equity. Moreover, the 
decrease in shareholder value due to entrenched managers is widely acknowledged, and trends 
towards more and more sophisticated levels of corporate governance might lead to decreased 
emphasis on managerial entrenchment in future studies (see e.g. Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrel, 
2004).  
 
2.2.5. Market Timing Theory 
 
Market timing theory presents a widely supported and investigated suggestion for share 
issuance motives and reasoning for capital structure. As Baker and Wurgler (2002) explain 
the theory in one sentence: “capital structure evolves as the cumulative outcome of past 
attempts to time the equity market”. Therefore, market timing theory does not assume that 
there should necessarily be an optimal capital structure towards which a firm is heading with 
its decisions about share and debt issuances. Instead, current capital structure is based on past 
decisions to issue or repurchase shares depending on how management’s view has differed 
from the market’s view of firm’s share price.  
For instance, Graham and Harvey (2001) have studied the effect of share price on equity 
issuances. They find clear evidence that managers don’t want to issue equity if they think it is 
undervalued due to information asymmetry, and if they feel equity issuance is required they 
prefer to issue after information release that will increase share price. Moreover, the same 
study brings support for the claim that managers believe they can time the market. Also, 
Baker and Wurgler (2002) conclude that the market timing theory best explains their results 
on capital structure decisions.  
Widely popular market timing theory is questioned very recently by McLean (2011). In 
presence of market timing, firms should increase their share issuance-cash savings when the 
firm is perceived to be overvalued by the managers. However, McLean finds challenging 
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evidence as his conclusion is that share issuance – cash savings are not related to post-
issuance stock returns.  
 
2.2.6. Precautionary Share Issuances Theory 
 
A totally new point of view for share issuance motives is constructed by McLean (2011). 
McLean shows that firms save large portion of their proceeds from share issuances as cash, 
and that precautionary motive for cash holdings best explains the need for share issuances. 
Moreover, during the time period 1971 – 2008 the cash savings ratio from share issuance 
proceeds increased from 23% to 60% and correspondingly increasing precautionary motives 
are able to explain this trend. The demand for share issuance – cash savings by firms is 
explained by decreasing internal cash flows that are insufficient to meet the requirements of 
precautionary cash savings. As proxies for precautionary motives, McLean uses R&D 
spending, industry cash flow volatility, dividend payments, and their first principal 
component. Trends in these proxies match the trend in propensity to save share issuance 
proceeds as cash.  
The study by McLean is also comprehensive in a sense that it contributes to share issuance 
literature in three areas. First, precautionary cash savings are stated as a motivation for share 
issuances. Second, results are inconsistent with market timing theory, thus having a 
controversial view on current trend in share issuance literature (as discussed in previous 
section). Third, increase in share issuances during economic expansions is explained by 
precautionary cash demand because high-precautionary firms show the highest increase in 
share issuances during expansions. Further, McLean contributes to cash savings literature by 
challenging the perceived source for precautionary savings. That is, already since 1985, share 
issuances have been the main source for precautionary cash savings instead of internal cash 
flows as prior studies have assumed.  
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3. HYPOTHESES 
 
In this thesis, I expect to find significant evidence on increased cash ratios within the time 
period 1995 - 2010 for the sample of data from publicly listed EU15 firms that are described 
in Section 4. Furthermore, I expect that share issuances have been the main source for cash 
savings recently and having increasing trend. At the same time, I expect that increase in 
precautionary motives can significantly explain both the increase in cash ratios as well as 
savings from share issuances.  
In order to investigate these assumptions, I have constructed two set of hypotheses. First set 
of hypotheses (H1A and H1B) follows closely the study by Bates, Kahle and Stulz (2009) to 
examine whether cash ratios have increased within the investigated time period. Also, the 
development of net debt is investigated. The second set of hypotheses (H2, H3, H4 and H5) 
follows the study by McLean (2011) by investigating whether share issuances have been the 
main source for cash savings, and whether cash savings is the primary motivation for share 
issuances over investment motive. Most importantly, interaction between precautionary 
motives and share issuance – cash savings is examined. Each hypothesis empirically 
investigated in this thesis is presented next.  
 
H1A. European firms have increased their cash ratios during time period 1995 – 2006 
Bates, Kahle and Stulz (2009) find that cash ratios for U.S. firms have increased dramatically 
during last few decades. Accordingly, I investigate if the same is true for European firms 
during period 1995 – 2006. Years of recent financial crisis (2007 – 2010) are included in the 
overall assessment but their effect on time trend tests is excluded. Investigating the potential 
increase in cash ratios creates a starting point for further study behind the reasons of this 
development. In addition to investigating the sample as an aggregate, I further study the 
development of cash ratios by delineating firms by selected firm characteristics. First, firms 
are divided to quintiles by their size in order to study if development of cash ratios has been 
similar for all size groups. Then, firms are divided to sub-groups by their IPO-status (IPO 
within five years), dividend payment status (dividend payers vs. non-dividend payers) and 
accounting performance (positive net income vs. negative income) in order to examine if cash 
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ratios have changed more for firms with some of these specific characteristics. The effect of 
precautionary motives on cash ratios is further investigated separately in Hypothesis 2. 
 
H1B. Firms have decreased their net debt levels during time period 1995 – 2006 
Net debt is a component which is constructed by subtracting cash from total debt. Therefore, I 
also examine the development of net debt to see whether changes in cash ratios have moved 
together with similar changes in leverage. If this is the case, then net debt would have 
remained at a rather steady level during the sample period. However, Bates, Kahle and Stulz 
(2009) report that as firms have significantly increased their cash ratios, leverage levels have 
remained at a steady level. Consequently, the average net debt ratio has dramatically 
decreased from positive 16.4% in 1980 to negative value of -1.0% in 2006 in their sample of 
U.S. firms. In order to see if this is the case also with European firms, I include brief 
investigation of leverage levels to my empirical study. If my results are similar to those in 
Bates, Kahle and Stulz, I can conclude that firms have not financed increased cash ratios by 
debt and that decreasing their net debt levels might have been one motivation for increasing 
their cash ratios.  
 
H2. Firms with highest precautionary motives have highest cash ratios 
In Hypothesis 2, I move on to investigate the relation between precautionary motives and cash 
holdings. Following McLean (2011), I construct four different proxies for precautionary 
motives: Cash flow volatility, Dividends, R&D and PREC. McLean argues that firms with 
high industry cash flow volatility and R&D expenditures, and low dividends are more 
exposed to precautionary motives of holding cash. In other words, these firms need to hold 
more cash in order to be prepared for worse-than-expected financial results and keeping their 
R&D continuously running. Moreover, non-dividend payers are generally perceived to be 
financially more constrained and are therefore forced to hold higher cash balances compared 
to firms that pay dividends (see e.g. Han and Qiu, 2007). PREC is a first principal component 
of three before-mentioned proxies, which is meant to capture the precautionary component in 
each of these three measures. Therefore, the first part of assessing the effect of precautionary 
motives on cash holding, and later on share issuance-cash savings, is to examine whether 
sample firms that have highest values of PREC hold more cash.  
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H3. Share issuances are the main source for cash savings 
Prior studies have assumed that internal cash flows are the main source for cash savings (see 
e.g. Almeida, Campello and Weisbach, 2004
5
; and Han and Qiu, 2007). However, McLean 
(2011) reports that share issuances have actually been the main source for cash saving for 
U.S. firms already since 1985. McLean argues that this is mainly due to relatively decreased 
internal cash flows on the one hand, and increased precautionary motives on the other. 
Increased need for external financing sources has not affected U.S. firms’ leverage levels as 
McLean reports that firms do not usually save significant portion of debt proceeds. Therefore, 
I investigate whether cash is saved mostly from share issuances or is there different behavior 
observed for European firms compared to their U.S. counterparties, which would mean that 
major source of cash savings would be either internal cash flow or debt financing. The scope 
of cash savings for each cash source is examined by multiplying the amount of capital raised 
with savings rate that is constructed using regression model described in Section 5. 
 
H4. Within-firm increases in precautionary motives cause increases in within-firm share 
issuance cash – savings  
McLean (2011) finds increasing and significant trends for both share issuance - cash savings 
and precautionary motives for U.S. firms during sample period 1971 – 2008. Thus, as both 
variables have observable unit root, they might be cointegrated and could have explanatory 
power for each other. Further, McLean finds that within-firm changes in each precautionary 
motive proxy (Cash flow volatility, Dividends, R&D and PREC) cause within-firm changes in 
share issuance – cash savings. More specifically, within-firm increases in Cash flow volatility, 
R&D and PREC, and within-firm decreases in Dividends are shown to increase within-firm 
savings from share issuances. This is basically the main result in McLean’s empirical research 
and therefore I duplicate his firm- and year-fixed effects regression model to conclude 
whether there is similar causality between within-firm precautionary motives and share 
issuance – cash savings for European data sample.  
 
 
                                                 
5
 In their study, Almeida et al. (2004) conclude that financially constraint firms have positive cash flow 
sensitivity of cash, meaning that they save more when cash flows are higher. However, the alternative of share 
issuances is not discussed.  
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H5. Cash savings is the main motive for share issuances 
Final part of my empirical research investigates whether investments or cash savings are the 
main motivation for issue shares in general. Again, I follow McLean (2011), who argues that 
cash savings have been the main motivation for share issuances and that the investment 
motivation has had decreasing trend over cash savings motivation. To investigate this 
behavior in European context, I construct two measures to assess the primary motivation 
behind share issuances. First, I investigate whether firms would have been able to run their 
operations and make the planned investments also without usage of share issuance proceeds. 
Second, I examine if firms that issue shares have usually abnormally high investments that 
year compared to average investment on the whole sample period. Thus, if firms would have 
been able to undertake their investments without the help of share issuances, and if firms 
usually have no abnormal investments during the year of issuances, I can conclude that cash 
savings have been the main motivation for share issuances over the investment motivation.  
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3.1. Summary of Hypotheses 
 
Research questions and their null hypotheses grounded on prior financial literature are 
reported on Table 1 below.  
 
Table 1 Summary of Research Questions and Hypotheses 
This table summarizes main research questions and hypotheses of the thesis.  Five research questions are 
presented in the column on the left and null hypothesis answering to research question on the right column.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Research question Hypotheses
1. Are European firms holding more cash and 
are they more leveraged than they used to?
H1A European firms have increased their cash 
ratios during time period 1995 - 2006.
H1B Firms have decreased their net debt 
levels during time period 1995 - 2006.
2. Is there relation between cash holdings and 
precautionary motives?
H2 Firms with highest precautionary motives 
have highest cash ratios.
3. What internal and external cash sources 
firms are using for cash savings?
H3 Share issuances are the main source for 
cash savings. 
4. Is there a relation between precautionary 
motives and amount of cash saved from 
share issuances?
H4 Within-firm increases in precautionary 
motives cause increases in within-firm 
share issuance - cash savings. 
5. Are shares primarily issued for investment 
purposes or for cash savings?
H5 Cash savings is the main motive for share 
issuances. 
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4. DATA 
 
Data is retrieved from Thomson ONE Banker using Worldscope database whenever possible 
in order to construct variables consistently. This thesis is constructed on European context 
using the data of publicly listed active and non-active firms from EU15
6
 countries. For the 
purpose of this thesis, I exclude all financial institutions because their motive for cash 
holdings may be to meet capital requirements rather than having similar economic reasons as 
other companies. Also utilities are excluded because their cash holdings can be affected by 
governmental regulation and are therefore incomparable to other private companies. The 
primary sample period consists from years 1995 to 2010 and secondary sample period of 1995 
to 2006 is used in time trend tests in order to exclude the effect of recent financial crisis 
during 2007 – 2010. The beginning year of 1995 is selected due to data availability. Some 
basic data is easily found from Worldscope even before 1995 but there are many data items 
that are properly reported only after the beginning of 1990s.  
 
4.1. Sample Construction 
 
I start by gathering all publicly listed active and non-active EU15 companies from Thomson 
ONE Banker. All companies with SIC codes 6000-6999 (financial companies) and 4900-4999 
(utilities) are excluded from the sample due to reasons described earlier. After these 
limitations, sample includes a total of 4,352 unique companies of which 476 companies are 
excluded due to lack of data. Thus, the baseline sample size is 3,876 companies which is a 
sufficient amount for the purpose of this study. Because also non-active companies are 
included, the sample includes many companies that do not have observations for each year for 
period 1995 – 2010. As expected, the amount of observations increases steadily towards the 
end of the period. Due to both data availability and increase in listed companies, the amount 
of firm-year observations increases from 873 in 1995 to 3,316 in 2010. However, each year 
has sufficient amount of observations in order to receive reliable results from regressions and 
other statistical tests. Total amount of firm-year observations during time period 1995 – 2010 
                                                 
6
 EU15 includes the following countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. 
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is 41,144. Distribution of observations during sample period is depicted in Figure 1. Amount 
of firm-year observations by country are presented in Appendix 1. 
 
 
Figure 1 Distribution of Observations 
Data sample consists of 3,876 unique publicly listed active and non-active companies from EU15 countries 
during time period 1995 – 2010. Amount of yearly observations increases towards the end of sample period. The 
sample consists of 41,144 firm year observations. 
 
Table 2 below defines the main variables used in the empirical part of this thesis. All 
variables are constructed from two or more data items retrieved from Worldscope database. 
The dependent variable in regression models used in this thesis is ΔCash, which is the 
absolute change in firm’s cash ratio during one financial year. Therefore, if a company did not 
report at least two consecutive annual cash levels, it was excluded from the final sample. 
Issue, Debt, Cash flow and Other are the four cash sources companies have and they are all 
divided by lagged total assets in order to make them comparable between companies. My 
decision to use consistently lagged book value of total assets is derived from McLean’s 
(2011) convention. Cash flow volatility, Dividends, R&D and PREC represent the set of 
precautionary motive variables. Assets is a control variable constructed by taking a natural 
logarithm of book value of lagged total assets. All four cash sources and four precautionary 
motives are further discussed in Sections 4.2.1. and 4.2.2., respectively. 
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Table 2 Variable and Data Item Definitions 
Table defines main variables constructed from data items that are retrieved from Thomson ONE Banker 
Worldscope database. Most variables are made comparable by dividing with book value of total assets at the 
beginning of year (lagged assets). Cash flow volatility and Assets are presented as natural logarithms, and PREC 
is the first principal component of the three precautionary motive proxies (Cash flow volatility, Dividends and 
R&D). 
 
 
 
 
I have no limitations considering the size, age, nor turnover of sample companies. As 
mentioned, companies are made comparable by scaling with lagged total assets. However, in 
order to remove outliers from the sample, I winsorize each variable at 1% level before 
running any statistical tests.  
Variable Definition
Cash ratio Cash and cash equivalents scaled by lagged book value of assets.
Δ Cash
Difference between cash ratio at the end of year (t) and cash ratio at the beginning of 
the year (t-1).
Issue
All cash proceeds from share issuances that result in cash flow to the firm scaled by 
lagged book value of assets.
Debt Cash proceeds from debt sales scaled by lagged book value of assets.
Cash flow Net income plus amortization & depreciation scaled by lagged book value of assets.
Other
Cash proceeds from other cash sources than Issue , Debt,  or Cash flow, scaled by 
lagged book value of assets. Includes sale of investments  and sale of property, plant 
and equipment.
Assets Natural logarithm of lagged book value of assets.
Cash flow volatility
Natural logarithm of average cash flow volatility of companies within same two-digit 
SIC code. Measured over the past five years, minimum of three observations required.
Dividends Paid cash dividends scaled by lagged book value of assets.
R&D
Research & development cost scaled by lagged book value of assets. Marked as zero 
if not reported.
PREC The first principal component of Cash flow volatility , Dividends  and R&D.
PrecProxy x Issue
Interaction term constructed by multiplying a firm-specific precautionary motive proxy 
( Cash flow volatility, Dividends, R&D,  or PREC ) by firm-specific value for Issue .
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4.2. Variable Construction 
 
The dependent variable used in regressions at the empirical part of this thesis is ΔCash, which 
is the difference between cash at the ending of the year (t) and cash at the beginning of the 
year (t-1) scaled by book value of total assets at the beginning of the year (t-1). Main 
explanatory variables can be divided to two groups: cash sources and precautionary motive 
proxies. The construction of these variables is discussed in next two sections. All variables 
used in empirical regressions in Section 6 are generated following the methods used by 
McLean (2011). Furthermore, if some data values (such as R&D expenditures or other 
income that are not reported by all companies) are missing from companies that are active in 
that particular year, these values are consistently assumed to be zero. 
 
4.2.1. Cash Sources 
 
A company can have both internal and external sources of cash and even this kind of simple 
split between cash sources could be used in order to examine their effect on changes in cash 
ratios. However, internal cash sources can be further divided to operational and non-
operational cash flows. Similarly, external cash sources can be divided to equity and debt 
issuances.  
Issue is an item in cash flow statement and it represents cash proceeds from equity sales. It is 
the amount of euros received from share issuances during the financial year, scaled by lagged 
total assets. Thus, it does not distinguish between different types of equity issuance proceeds 
but all issuances are included as long as they create cash flow for the company. For instance, 
mergers financed with stock are excluded as they do not result cash proceeds. Because Issue 
is scaled by total assets at the beginning of the year, the sample does not include any cash 
proceeds from initial public offerings (IPOs) due to a technical reason. For example, if a 
company was publicly listed (i.e. it arranged an IPO) during 1995, its issue proceeds should 
have been scaled by assets at the end of 1994. However, Thomson ONE Banker reports data 
items only since the company has become public and therefore there would be no total assets 
reported for the company at the end of 1994. On the other hand, Issue is not limited to 
seasoned equity offerings only but it includes also any other equity sale that results for a cash 
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proceed to the company. For this reason, different kinds of equity sales are not distinguished 
but all share issuance proceeds are treated similarly in the scope of this thesis.  
Debt is cash proceeds from debt sales scaled by lagged total assets. Thus, there is no 
difference whether the issued debt is short-term or long-term in nature. It is derived from 
balance sheet as the difference of total debt at the end of year and total debt at the beginning 
of year. As Debt represents specifically cash inflows for the company, it should not have a 
negative value and therefore all negative differences are marked as zero, indicating that the 
company has not made debt sales during the year. Debt sales as a cash flow statement items 
were largely missing in Thomson ONE Banker and that is why the variable is constructed 
using balance sheet items. Moreover, this method is a simple way to include increase of all 
kinds of debts: whether it is an increase of short-term credit line or long-term debt issuances.  
Cash flow is derived from income statement as net income plus depreciation and amortization, 
scaled by lagged total assets. Thus, all internally generated operational turnover is not 
classified as cash flow because (usually) a majority of this income is not available for free use 
for the company but large part of turnover is used to cover different kinds of costs that 
generate the income. In other words, cash flow in this context means the amount of internally 
generated cash that is the result of company’s operations, i.e. net income. Depreciation and 
amortization are added to net income because they do not have real effect on cash flow but 
their effect on net income is derived from balance sheet. There are also other manners to 
construct the cash flow variable. For example, Bates, Kahle and Stulz (2009) define it as 
EBITDA minus interest, taxes, and common dividends. However, my definition for internal 
cash flow follows the one by McLean (2011).  
Other represents all other cash sources that are not included in Issue, Debt, or Cash flow. 
Thus, it basically includes cash inflows from sales of investments and sales of plant, property 
and equipment. Other is reported as income statement figure “other income” in Thomson 
ONE Banker and scaled by lagged total assets. Due to its nature, Other is more extraordinary 
cash source than other three cash sources. It includes cash inflows that are received from non-
operational business transactions that don’t usually occur every financial year.  
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4.2.2. Precautionary Motive Proxies 
 
Financial literature has agreed on three proxies that are able to capture the existence and scope 
of precautionary motives within individual companies: industry cash flow volatility, R&D 
expenses and dividends (see e.g. Opler et al. 1999, and Bates, Kahle and Stulz, 2009). In 
addition, McLean (2011) has created an index of the three above mentioned proxies in order 
to capture the precautionary motives of individual company to a one index called PREC. 
Following McLean, I also create four different proxies to measure precautionary motives of 
sample firms. 
Cash flow volatility is the natural logarithm of industry cash flow standard deviation (cash 
flow is defined in Table 2). First, natural logarithm of cash flow volatility over the last five 
years is calculated for each individual company for each sample year, a minimum of three 
observations is required. Then, outliers are excluded by winsorizing at 1% level. Next, 
companies are divided to industries by first two digits of their SIC codes. Finally, yearly 
industry cash flow volatility is retrieved by taking the average of industry firms’ cash flow 
volatility within two-digit SIC code industry classes. The reasoning of using cash flow 
volatility as a precautionary motive proxy is that companies within industries that have more 
unreliable cash flows (i.e. higher Cash flow volatility) tend to hold higher amounts of cash in 
order to be prepared for low cash flows during bad years. 
Dividends is paid cash dividends scaled by lagged total assets. To notify, rationale for using 
dividends as precautionary motive proxy is not all straightforward. Bates, Kahle and Stulz 
(2009) conclude that non-dividend payers hold more cash than dividend payers and that their 
cash ratios have been increasing recently. Moreover, Fazzari et al. (1988) and Han and Qui 
(2007) state that firms that do not pay dividends are financially more constraint than dividend 
payers and that is the reason why they hold higher precautionary cash savings. On the other 
hand, reason not to pay dividends might occur also if a firm is growing fast and needs to have 
precautionary cash savings in order to make new investments whenever appropriate. Thus, the 
decision not to pay dividends is not automatically related to financial constraints, but more on 
future prospects. Even though many papers have supported the use of dividends as 
precautionary motive proxy, McLean (2011) treats dividends with caution. This is because the 
relation between dividends and cash holdings can exist also mechanically: if a firm decides 
not to pay dividends, then it will have more cash compared to decision to pay dividends, all 
else equal (McLean, 2011). Thus, Dividends is a proxy that needs to be interpreted carefully 
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while its explanatory power in relation to cash holdings might be ambiguous, but at the same 
time it is also interesting to compare findings in empirical part to recent studies that are made 
in U.S. context. 
R&D is research and development costs scaled by lagged total assets. Firms that spend more 
on R&D are observed to hold higher levels of cash (Opler et al. 1999, and Bates, Kahle and 
Stulz, 2009). This is because R&D-intense firms have usually more valuable investment 
opportunities on sight and that is why they need to be prepared to utilize them by keeping 
precautionary cash holdings. As argued in case of Dividends, McLean (2011) again points out 
the obvious: R&D actions spend cash and therefore R&D and cash holdings might have 
negative relation as well. However, both Opler et al. and Bates, Kahle and Stulz have shown 
that generally R&D spending is associated with higher cash holdings and that R&D as 
precautionary motive proxy is well justified. As it is noted in studies executed in U.S. context, 
most companies don’t report any R&D expenses during financial year. Same lack of data is 
present for European firms in Thomson ONE Banker and therefore majority of R&D 
observations are forced to be marked as zero.  
Following McLean (2011), I construct one additional precautionary motive proxy called 
PREC from three above-mentioned precautionary motive proxies. PREC is the first principal 
component of Cash flow volatility, Dividends and R&D. In other words, each of three proxies 
is likely to contain both precautionary motives component and component that is not 
connected to precautionary motives. PREC is thus created in order to capture the common 
precautionary component in each of these proxies (see e.g. Jolliffe, 2005
7
). Due to the nature 
of proxies discussed in earlier paragraphs, PREC is expected to be higher for firms with high 
industry cash flow volatility, low-dividend payers and firms with high R&D spending. PREC 
is also constructed using only Cash flow volatility and R&D due to the ambiguous 
interpretation of Dividends as a precautionary motive. This method however results to similar 
findings compared to PREC where Dividends is included
8
. Therefore, I decided to report only 
the results using the PREC that is constructed using all three precautionary motive proxies. 
PREC is calculated for the whole sample (i.e. all firm-year observations) at one time in order 
to make the first principal component comparable for each year and each firm. In order to a 
single firm to retrieve a value for PREC, it needs to have observation for all its components. 
                                                 
7
Brief definition of principal component analysis is stated e.g. in Jolliffe (2005):  “The central idea of principal 
component analysis is to reduce the dimensionality of a data set consisting of a large number of interrelated 
variables, while retaining as much possible of the variation present in the data set.”  
8
 These two alternative methods for constructing the first principal component have a correlation of over 0.800. 
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In other words, if observation for Cash flow volatility, R&D, or Dividends is missing, PREC 
cannot be calculated. However, as mentioned earlier, if firm does not report e.g. R&D during 
a financial year, it is assumed to be zero. Otherwise the limited availability of R&D 
observations would dramatically decrease the amount of observations for PREC as well. The 
construction of PREC results for first principal components (or eigenvectors) of 0.701, 0.619 
and -0.354 for Cash flow volatility, R&D and Dividends, respectively. Thus, signs for 
eigenvectors are as expected as increase in Cash flow volatility and R&D have positive effect 
on PREC (positive components) and Dividends has negative effect (negative component).  
 
4.3. Summary Statistics 
 
Main variables used in empirical part and their statistics are reported in Table 3. As defined in 
Table 2, most of these variables are ratios, scaled by lagged book value of assets but there are 
some exceptions as well. Cash flow volatility and Assets are natural logarithms, PREC is the 
first principal component of Cash flow volatility, Dividends and R&D. Mean values for 
variables and amount of observations by country are presented in Appendix 1. 
 
Table 3 Summary Statistics for Data Sample 
Table reports summary statistics for main variables defined earlier in Table 2. Sample consists of 3,876 unique 
companies during time period 1995 – 2010 with 41,144 firm year observations. 
 
Variable Mean Std Dev 25th percentile Median 75th percentile
Cash ratio 0.151 0.17 0.035 0.09 0.201
Δ Cash 0.038 0.288 -0.026 0.001 0.039
Issue 0.062 0.312 0.000 0.000 0.003
Debt 0.030 0.089 0.000 0.000 0.005
Cash flow 0.058 0.179 0.024 0.081 0.136
Other 0.028 0.044 0.003 0.013 0.033
Cash flow vol. -2.601 0.609 -3.082 -2.614 -2.102
Dividends 0.015 0.025 0.000 0.004 0.021
R&D 0.017 0.049 0.000 0.000 0.003
PREC 0.000 0.874 -0.695 -0.113 0.560
Assets (Log) 18.624 2.112 17.149 18.465 19.990
Total Assets (M€) 1023.966 3304.429 23.609 90.681 429.016
Cash (M€) 168.158 878.619 1.758 8.595 40.636
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5. RESEARCH METHODS 
 
This section describes the main research methodology constructed to empirically investigate 
the theory-based hypotheses presented in Section 3, thus following the principals of 
hypothesis-deductive research model. Throughout this thesis I am following the methods used 
by Bates, Kahle and Stulz (2009) and McLean (2011). However, in case there are differences 
on how some methods are conducted in these two papers in order to measure the same 
feature, I use the method chosen by McLean. Next, I present the regression model for 
measuring cash savings rates; method to assess unit roots; the application of Fama-MacBeth 
regression model; the firm-fixed effects regression model; and correlation matrix for 
independent variables used in regressions. 
 
5.1. Regression Model for Cash Savings Rates 
 
External and internal cash sources available for a firm were classified to four categories in 
Section 4: Issue, Debt, Cash flow and Other. For the purpose of investigating the Hypothesis 3 
presented in Section 3, amount of cash saved from each cash sources needs to be explored. 
First step is to construct yearly cash savings rates from each cash source. In other words, the 
explanatory power of different cash sources in explaining the change in cash is investigated 
by following regression model: 
 
ΔCashi = α + β1 Issueit + β2 Debtit + β3 Cash flowit + β4 Otherit + β5 Assetsit + εit,    (1) 
 
where i denotes specific year within sample period 1995 – 2010. Thus, parameter estimates 
from yearly regression are interpreted as cash savings rates for each cash source.  
Second, yearly mean values for cash sources are calculated in order to investigate and 
compare the scope of cash received from each source. Finally, the amount of cash saved from 
each cash source is calculated by combining the results from first two steps: 
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Amount of cash savedi,k = Cash savings ratei,k x Mean value of cash raisedi,k , (2) 
 
where i denotes specific year within sample period 1995 – 2010, and k stands for specific cash 
source. Using this method, I am able to report the yearly amounts of cash saved (scaled by 
total assets) from each cash source.  
 
5.2. Unit Root Assessment 
 
Possible time trends during the sample period for cash sources and precautionary proxies are 
investigated in empirical part of this paper. Especially, relation between precautionary 
motives and share issuances receive comprehensive focus. Therefore, regression model is 
constructed in order to investigate whether variables have experienced statistically significant 
increase or decrease during sample period. Thus, time series for specific variable is concluded 
to have a unit root if it has a significantly increasing or decreasing time trend. Unit root test 
enables the investigation of potential cointegration between variables. Time trends are 
examined with following regression equation: 
 
μki = α + β1 Timei + β2 AR + … + βn AR ,   (3) 
 
where μki denotes yearly mean value for variable k at time i, Time denotes for time coefficient 
marked as 1 for year 1995 and 12 for year 2006, and AR denotes for autoregressive lag 
term(s). In trend tests, I exclude years 2007 – 2010 from the sample as the effect of financial 
crisis usually deteriorates the potential trend in a variable that could be present during normal 
economic conditions. Therefore, unit root assessment includes 12 observations from years 
1995 – 2006. While the time series is rather short in order to result statistically significant 
time trends, I also depict development of variables with graphical presentation for robustness. 
Despite the limitation of my time series observations, I receive mostly similar time trends for 
variables compared to McLean (2011).  
In his paper, McLean (2011) has used consistently 4 autoregressive lag terms because partial 
autocorrelation for each of the variables used in his time trend regressions are stated to 
become close to zero within four lags. However, the same is not true with the data sample I 
am using but the amount of autoregressive lag terms varies from zero to four. The amount of 
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autoregressive lag terms is chosen by testing which amount of lag terms is enough to get rid 
from (possible) partial autocorrelation within each variable. When it comes to cash sources - 
i.e. Issue, Debt, Cash flow, and Other - Issue is the only one that has no autocorrelation 
between observations considering the yearly amounts of capital raised. On the other hand, all 
precautionary motive proxies, i.e. Cash flow volatility, Dividends, R&D and PREC, have at 
least some autocorrelation between observations as expected. The addition of autoregressive 
lag terms always decreases the significance of the test compared to regression without any lag 
terms. Therefore, time trend tests for precautionary motive proxies are somewhat ambiguous 
as graphical presentation and regression model might suggest different conclusions. This is 
due to limitation of time series observations as discussed earlier.  
I use Durbin-Watson’s test score for autocorrelation in time trend regressions. Autocorrelation 
is controlled the better the closer the Durbin-Watson score is the value of 2.0. In case the test 
score is much lower than two, there is positive serial correlation between observations, i.e. 
observations are close to each other, and when the score is much higher than two, the opposite 
is true, i.e. observations are negatively autocorrelated. Durbin-Watson test score is always 
between 0 and 4 and all my trend regressions have a Durbin-Watson score between 1.51 and 
3.11. 
 
5.3. Fama-MacBeth Regression 
 
Regression model presented first in Fama and MacBeth (1973) is used in my thesis to 
investigate the persistence of cash savings rates. Originally, the Fama-MacBeth regression is 
used for asset pricing models and its suitability for many corporate finance settings are 
questioned due to higher autocorrelation in corporate finance context compared to asset 
pricing. As recently discussed in Petersen (2009), Fama-MacBeth method works well when 
residuals are correlated within a year but not across firms.  
I follow McLean (2011) to construct Fama-MacBeth regression for persistence of cash 
savings rates. The aim is to show whether firms maintain cash savings rates from different 
cash sources, or could it be that firms only save cash proceeds during the year of issuance but 
spend the cash quickly in the subsequent years. The process is two-stepped. First, equation (1) 
is run for each sample year separately four times with four different dependent variables: 
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ΔCash, ΔCasht+1, ΔCasht+2 and ΔCasht+3. Second, mean values from yearly coefficients, t-
statistics, and R-squared scores are reported as final results.  
 
5.4. Firm- and Year-fixed Effects Regression Model 
 
In panel data setting, each firm has multiple observations over different periods. As discussed 
for example in Li and Prabhala (2007), firm-fixed effects can control the unobservable 
attributes that are fixed over time. Firm-fixed effects models are widely used in other 
corporate finance studies as well (see e.g. Palia, 2001; Schoar, 2002; and Mullainathan and 
Scharfstein, 2001). Furthermore, McLean (2011) states that firm-fixed effects model, and the 
interaction term within, provides a conservative estimate to test whether changes over time in 
one variable cause changes over time in another.  
From four cash sources, specifically share issuances receive most focus in the latter part of 
this thesis. The possible interaction between precautionary motives for cash holdings and 
share issuance – cash savings is examined in detail by widening regression (1) to a form 
which includes both firm and year-fixed effects:  
 
ΔCashi = αi + at + β1 Issueit + β2 Debtit + β3 Cash flowit + β4 Otherit + 
 β5 Assetsit +β6 PrecProxyit + βn PrecProxyit x Issueit + εit , (4) 
 
where αi is each firm’s own intercept given by the firm-fixed effect in the model. PrecProxy is 
Cash flow volatility, Dividends, R&D, or PREC. Thus, the coefficient for PrecProxy x Issue 
represents an interaction term between a precautionary proxy and share issuance - cash 
savings. The interpretation of interaction term is that, if statistically significant, within-firm 
changes in precautionary motive cause changes in within-firm share issuance – cash savings. 
Results from this regression model are in the core of this thesis as they conclude whether 
Hypothesis 4 presented in Section 3 is supported.  
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5.5. Correlation Matrix 
 
In this section, I discuss the correlations between independent variables that are used in 
regressions run in Section 6. Correlations between all independent variables are presented in 
Table 4.  
Issue does not have high absolute correlations between any precautionary proxies: Cash flow 
volatility, Dividends, R&D nor PREC. To emphasize, even though I examine the possible 
interaction between changes in precautionary motives and share issuances, the lack of 
correlation between these proxies is irrelevant
9
. This is because specifically their interaction 
explaining ΔCash is in the main focus, i.e. does increase in a precautionary motive proxy 
cause increase in cash savings received from share issuances. 
 
Table 4 Correlation Matrix for Independent Variables 
This table presents Pearson correlations between each independent variable. Highest absolute correlations are 
observed between precautionary motive proxies. In all regression models, precautionary motive proxies are used 
as independent variables in separate regressions. PREC has positive correlation between Cash flow volatility and 
R&D and negative correlation between Dividends. The sample consists of 41,144 firm year observations during 
period 1995 – 2010. 
 
 
As expected, Issue is negatively correlated with Cash flow: firms with steady and positive 
cash flows need not to issue as much equity in order to secure sufficient amount of cash in 
                                                 
9
 And, considering their role as explanatory variables low correlation is expected. 
Issue Debt Cash flow Other Assets CF vol. Dividends R&D PREC
Issue 1
Debt 0.029 1
Cash flow -0.171 0.025 1
Other 0.031 0.010 0.025 1
Assets -0.090 0.109 0.178 -0.033 1
CF vol. 0.071 -0.013 -0.090 0.010 -0.230 1
Dividends -0.07 0.027 0.299 -0.041 0.119 -0.059 1
R&D 0.079 0.003 -0.039 0.013 -0.042 0.097 0.031 1
PREC 0.116 -0.017 -0.201 0.029 -0.236 0.782 -0.373 0.593 1
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their balance sheets. Cash flow has positive, though very low correlation with Debt. In this 
context, it can be interpreted that even though positive-cash-flow firms may not need as much 
debt financing, they usually have better access to external financing and can hence also utilize 
leverage in order to increase their returns on equity. 
What is interesting in correlations between precautionary motive proxies is that all three 
components of PREC have low correlation between each other. Thus, it seems that a firm 
with precautionary motive to hold excess cash has usually one primary factor that creates the 
need for precautionary cash holdings. For Cash flow volatility, Dividends and R&D, the 
highest correlation of 0.097 is observed between Cash flow volatility and R&D. On the other 
hand, the three precautionary proxies are highly correlated with PREC since it presents the 
first principal component of Cash flow volatility, Dividends and R&D. Furthermore, proxies 
have expected signs with PREC: firms with high industry cash flow volatility, low dividends 
and high R&D expenditures were stated to have more precautionary motives for cash 
holdings in Section 4.2.2. Finally, it is notable that Cash flow volatility has the highest 
correlation of 0.782 with PREC, which indicates that it is the most dominant proxy explaining 
PREC in my sample data.  
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6. RESULTS 
 
This part reviews my empirical findings and discusses the evidence for the hypotheses 
presented in Section 3. Section 6.1. investigates whether there have been some dramatic 
changes in cash ratios and net debt levels for European firms during time period 1995 – 2010. 
Section 6.2. further analyses which firm characteristics seem to be typical for firms with high 
cash holdings, and relation between precautionary motives and cash savings is introduced. 
Section 6.3. reports the role of different cash sources for cash savings purposes. Section 6.4. 
tests the persistence of cash savings rates among different cash sources on a four-year 
window. Section 6.5. reports the most important empirical evidence of this thesis by 
examining the interaction between precautionary motives and share issuance – cash savings. 
Finally, Section 6.6. briefly tests whether cash savings or investments seem to be the primary 
motivation for share issuances in general. 
 
6.1. Increase in Cash Ratios   
 
I start my empirical part by examining whether there has been actual increase in cash ratios 
during the sample period. Bates, Kahle and Stulz (2009) found significant increasing trend in 
both average and median cash ratios for U.S. firms during 1980 – 2006 and thus same kind of 
development is expected with my dataset. Further, I examine whether firms have decreased 
their net debt by increasing cash ratios. Bates, Kahle and Stulz report that firms have 
decreased their net debt levels and this can be due to decreased debt levels, increased cash 
holdings, or both. 
Table 5 reports annual averages and medians for cash ratio, leverage and net leverage for my 
sample of 41,144 firm year observations. Columns 2 and 3 depict yearly average and median 
values for cash ratios, respectively. Both columns indicate increasing trend for cash ratio until 
2007 – 2009 when there is a clear dip in cash held by sample firms. Cash ratios start to 
recover in 2010 as both average and median values perceive an increase compared to 2009. 
As discussed in Section 5.2., the recent global financial crisis has obvious effect on results 
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and thus period 1995 to 2006 is later examined separately in order to eliminate abnormal time 
period from the sample.  
Average cash ratio has increased from 1995 to 2006 by 48.7% (from 11.5% to 17.1%) and 
increase for median cash ratio is 25.6% (from 8.2% to 10.3%). Even with natural decrease in 
cash holdings during recent financial crisis, the increase in average cash ratios from 1995 to 
2010 is 35.7%, and 24.4% for the median, indicating clear upward trend in cash ratios. 
Furthermore, statistical significance of trend is measured in unreported tests for years 1995 -
2006. Correcting with autoregressive lag terms, slope coefficient for average cash ratio 
indicates annual increase of 0.22% during 12 year time period with nearly significant t-value 
of 1.48. Slope for median cash ratio shows yearly upward trend of 0.12% with t-value of 1.64 
being significant at 10% level
10
. Trends does not seem to be very significant statistically but it 
must be reminded that rather short time period makes significance tests sensitive to adverse 
observations. For example, there is also a decrease of cash ratios during the beginning of 
2000s which drops the significance of mainly upward trend during time period as a whole.  
Next, I examine the effect of cash on net debt levels in order to see whether changes in net 
debt are more due to changes in cash or changes in leverage levels. Columns 4 and 5 show 
average and median values for leverage, respectively. Leverage is measured as total debt 
divided by lagged total assets. When looking at time period 1995 – 2006, it can be seen that 
average leverage has remained at rather steady level being 20.7% in 1995 and 19.6% in 2006 
thus indicating small 5.3% decrease during 12 years. Median leverage has decreased 
relatively more: from 19.1% in 1995 to 16.6% in 2006 representing total decrease of 13.1% 
during same time. Although leverage has perceived slight decrease in time period 1995 – 
2006, there is no clear observable trend in leverage for sample firms. This is because 
unreported time trend tests have t-values below one for both average and median leverage 
time series. In addition, financial crisis doesn’t seem to have had significant effect on leverage 
levels as average leverage is basically at the same level in 2010 as it was in 1995. Therefore, 
it can be stated that firms have not made significant changes in leverage levels during sample 
periods.  
Net leverage, or net debt, is measured as total debt minus cash and cash equivalents divided 
by lagged total assets. Average and median net leverages for sample data are presented in 
columns 6 and 7. Again, I start by examining the results before financial crisis. Average net 
                                                 
10
 Trends are significant at 1% level if not using autoregressive lag terms. 
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leverage has decreased as much as 68.8% from 9.3% in 1995 to 2.9% in 2006. Decrease has 
been slightly smaller for median values; it has decreased from 10% to 6.5% at the same time 
period thus indicating a drop of 35%.  Decrease in net debt is due to increase in cash holdings 
because I concluded in previous paragraphs that there has been upward trend in cash ratios 
but leverage, as other variable constructing net debt, has remained steady during the same 
time period. Slope coefficient for time trend in average net leverage indicates significant 
yearly decrease of 0.37% with t-value of 1.79. Slope coefficient for median net leverage is 
insignificant, though clearly negative as well.  
 
Table 5 Average and Median Cash Ratios and Leverage Ratios from 1995 to 2010 
Table shows yearly average and median values for cash ratio, leverage and net leverage for all sample firms.  
Cash ratio is firm’s cash and cash equivalents divided by lagged total assets. Leverage is firm’s total debt divided 
by lagged total assets. Net leverage is total debt minus cash and cash equivalents divided by lagged total assets. 
The sample consists of 41,144 firm year observations during period 1995 – 2010. 
 
 
Year
Avg Cash 
Ratio
Median Cash 
Ratio
Avg 
Leverage
Median 
Leverage
Avg Net 
Leverage
Median Net 
Leverage
1995 0.115 0.082 0.207 0.191 0.093 0.100
1996 0.123 0.079 0.202 0.188 0.082 0.097
1997 0.137 0.090 0.201 0.182 0.067 0.086
1998 0.139 0.085 0.209 0.187 0.073 0.098
1999 0.150 0.087 0.206 0.183 0.060 0.091
2000 0.165 0.091 0.198 0.174 0.035 0.078
2001 0.150 0.081 0.213 0.195 0.066 0.104
2002 0.148 0.081 0.222 0.201 0.077 0.117
2003 0.153 0.088 0.222 0.193 0.073 0.104
2004 0.164 0.096 0.206 0.171 0.046 0.071
2005 0.169 0.101 0.198 0.163 0.033 0.072
2006 0.171 0.103 0.196 0.166 0.029 0.065
2007 0.161 0.095 0.202 0.174 0.045 0.078
2008 0.149 0.085 0.224 0.195 0.079 0.109
2009 0.152 0.098 0.219 0.193 0.070 0.095
2010 0.156 0.102 0.209 0.181 0.056 0.084
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To summarize, European firms held clearly more cash in 2006 than they did in 1995. 
Financial crisis displays strongest during 2007 – 2009 when firms were forced to decrease 
their cash holdings. On the other hand, there have not been any significant changes in 
leverage levels during more steady time period of 1995 – 2006. However, financial crisis 
forced firms to increase their debt levels probably because internal cash flows decreased with 
decreasing aggregate demand. As a result of increased cash holding and rather steady leverage 
levels, average net leverage has decreased significantly. This conclusion made with my 
European data sample is in line with findings of Bates, Kahle and Stulz (2009) who made the 
same observation with U.S. data. Next, the effect of selected firm characteristics is discussed 
in context of cash holdings.  
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6.2. Pervasiveness of Increased Cash Holdings 
 
In previous section, I concluded that as an aggregate sample European firms have perceived 
increase in cash ratios since 1995 and that their net debt levels have decreased due to this 
increase in cash holdings. Next, I examine if certain kind of firms have had higher increase in 
cash ratios than others. More specifically, firm size, IPO status, dividend payment status, 
accounting performance and scope of precautionary motives as firm characteristics are 
investigated in more detail.   
 
6.2.1. Firm Size and Increase in Cash Holdings 
 
I argue that firm size should have effect on firm’s cash holdings. Usually, largest firms 
operate in more saturated business environments and can therefore better predict the sufficient 
level of needed cash for each year. Moreover, even if largest firms usually have smaller cash 
ratios, their absolute cash holdings are much higher than for smaller companies. Next I 
investigate whether increase in cash ratios as stated in previous section is due to increase in 
particular size classes, or have all firms been increasing their cash ratios regardless the firm 
size. In order to execute this investigation, I divide sample firms every year to quintiles by 
book value of total assets. Average cash ratios for each size quintile and each year are 
presented in Figure 2. 
Figure 2 depicts clearly that increase in cash holdings within sample firms comes mainly from 
the smallest size quintiles. Actually two largest size quintiles seem to have no increasing trend 
whatsoever but they have maintained very steady amount of cash on their balance sheets 
throughout the entire time period. On the other hand, the increase in cash ratios for the two 
smallest size quintiles has been very aggressive. For comparison, average cash ratio for 
smallest size quintile, i.e. Q1, was 12.4% in 1995 and 28% in its peak year in 2006, thus 
representing an increase of 125.8% only within 12 years. At the same time period, average 
cash ratio for largest size quintile Q5 remained basically at the same level being 11.6% in 
1995 and 10.7% in 2006 (not reported in tables). 
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Figure 2 Average Cash Ratios by Firm Size Quintile from 1995 to 2010 
Figure depicts yearly average cash ratios for all sample firms by firm size quintiles. Average cash ratio is shown 
in the vertical axis and it is calculated as cash and cash equivalents divided by book value of total assets. Firms 
are divided to size quintiles by their book values of total assets. Q1 nominates the quintile for smallest firm sizes 
and Q5 nominates the quintile for largest firm sizes. The sample consists of 41,144 firm year observations during 
period 1995 – 2010. 
 
Interestingly, all size quintiles had cash ratios very close to each other in the beginning of 
sample period. This can be explained with smaller amount of observations in the beginning of 
data sample as depicted in Figure 1. Smallest size quintile perceives rather dramatic dip in 
cash holdings after year 2000 due to dot-com bubble and high investment era following it. 
Also the financial crisis in 2007 shows clearly for the smallest size quintiles. On the other 
hand, largest firms did not seem to perceive any dramatic changes in cash holdings during the 
economic downturn.  
Figure 3 supports the evidence shown in Table 5 by depicting that together with increased 
cash savings, firms have decreased their net debt levels. As mentioned in Section 6.1. firms 
have kept their debt levels at a rather steady stage and this seems to be the case despite the 
size of a firm. This is why Figure 3 is almost like a mirror image compared to Figure 2: as 
cash holdings for smallest firms increase, net debt decreases when leverage remains steady. 
Q1 and Q2 firms actually have negative net debt during most of the time period due to high 
cash savings. Therefore, the main conclusion here is that especially smaller firms have 
decreased their net debt levels by holding larger amounts of cash. 
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Figure 3 Average Net Debt Ratios by Firm Size Quintile from 1995 to 2010 
Figure depicts yearly average net leverage values for all sample firms by firm size quintiles. Average net 
leverage is shown in the vertical axis and it is calculated as total debt minus cash and cash equivalents divided by 
book value of total assets. Firms are divided to size quintiles by their book values of total assets. Q1 nominates 
the quintile for smallest firm sizes and Q5 nominates the quintile for largest firm sizes. The sample consists of 
41,144 firm year observations during period 1995 – 2010.   
 
 
6.2.2. IPO Status, Dividend Payments, Accounting Performance and Cash Holdings 
 
All sample firms are distinguished annually by their status of new issues (or IPOs), dividend 
status and accounting performance, and yearly average cash ratio for each group is reported in 
Table 6. One reason for increased overall cash holdings during time period might be the surge 
of IPO activity at late 1990s and beginning of 2000s. Moreover, as discussed in Bates, Kahle 
and Stulz (2009), IPO firms issue seasoned equity within few years after the initial offering 
more often than non-IPO firms. A firm is classified as IPO-firm if it conducted its initial 
public offering within the last five years, and non-IPO firm otherwise.  
As shown in Table 6, IPO-firms have larger cash ratios compared to non-IPO firms 
throughout the whole sample period. There has been clear increase in cash holdings for both 
IPO-classes from 1995 to 2006, and decrease during recent financial crisis. Increase has been 
43 
 
68.9% (from 15.1% to 25.5%) for IPO-firms and 28.6% (from 11.9% to 15.3%) for non-IPO 
firms before financial crisis. Statistically, after controlling with autoregressive lag terms, both 
IPO groups have naturally positive trends. However, trend is actually more significant for 
non-IPO firms with t-value 1.87, while t-value for IPO-firms’ time trend is only 1.29. 
Surprisingly low significance of time trends is due to rather low time period and the effect of 
decreased cash holdings for both IPO classes during the beginning of 2000s. Considering 
results discussed here, I conclude that increase in cash holdings is not mainly due to increased 
capital raising activities of IPO-firms because increased time trend is observed for non-IPO 
firms as well. This conclusion is in line with results found in Bates, Kahle and Stulz (2009).  
Fama and French (2001) find that U.S. firms’ propensity to pay dividends has declined 
dramatically after the peak year in 1978. They also conclude that dividend payers are more 
profitable and about 10 times larger than non-dividend payers. Non-dividend payers are in 
addition characterized to spend more on investments and R&D, and have higher P/B ratios 
compared to dividend payers (Fama and French, 2001). In addition, as discussed already in 
Section 2.2.6. firms that are not paying dividends are stated to have greater precautionary 
motives for additional cash holdings. Firm is categorized in dividend payer group if it has 
paid common dividend that year, and as a non-dividend payer otherwise. Average yearly cash 
ratios for both dividend status groups are presented in columns 4 and 5 of Table 6. 
Average cash ratio for dividend payers has remained very stable during the whole time 
period, and not even the recent financial crisis has had large negative effect on cash holdings 
among dividend payers (on the contrary, dividend payers have slightly increased their cash 
holdings after year 2008). Even though having some small fluctuation during 1995 – 2006, 
the average cash ratio for dividend payers remains basically at the same level and thus no 
statistically significant time trend is observed in non-tabulated time trend regressions. On the 
other hand, average cash ratio for non-dividend payers has doubled from 11% in 1995 to 
22.7% in 2006. Time trend test shows an average yearly increase of 0.79% in average cash 
ratio for non-dividend payers with significant t-statistic of 3.81. Again, these findings 
considering dividend payment status and increase in cash holding are similar to Bates, Kahle 
and Stulz (2009). Significant increase in cash holdings for non-dividend payers but not for 
dividend payers is also in line with the precautionary motive theory tested more thoroughly 
later in this thesis.  
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Columns 6 and 7 in Table 6 depict yearly average cash ratios for firms with negative and 
positive income. Accounting performance is measured with net income and the underlying 
assumption is that firms with negative income are more financially constrained than firms 
with positive income. Negative income firms exhibit very rapid increase in cash holdings 
during end of the 1990s and average cash ratio more than doubles in 5 years from 13% in 
1995 to 26.7% in 2000. During the latest decade, the average cash ratio for negative income 
firms fluctuates a bit but local maximum is once again in year 2006, i.e. just before the 
financial crisis. Time trend for cash holdings of negative income firms is positive but 
statistically insignificant due to decrease in cash ratios during first years of 2000s.  
 
Table 6 Average Cash Ratios by Selected Firm Characteristics 
Table reports yearly average cash ratios delineated by new issue status, dividend status and accounting 
performance. Firm is assigned to IPO subsample if it has executed its initial public offering within prior five 
calendar years and to Non-IPO subsample otherwise. Firm is assigned to Dividend Payer subsample if it paid 
common dividend during financial year and to Non-Dividend Payer subsample otherwise. A firm is classified by 
accounting performance to negative and non-negative income firms by its net income. T-statistics for differences 
in the average cash ratios between new issues, dividend status and accounting performance subsamples are 
reported in Appendix 2. Sample consists of 41,144 firm year observations during period 1995 – 2010. 
 
Year IPO Firms
Non-IPO 
Firms
Dividend 
Payers
Non-Dividend 
Payers
Negative 
Income Firms
Non-Negative 
Income Firms
1995 0.151 0.119 0.122 0.110 0.130 0.117
1996 0.170 0.127 0.119 0.144 0.169 0.119
1997 0.176 0.130 0.124 0.172 0.202 0.129
1998 0.170 0.132 0.124 0.177 0.203 0.129
1999 0.199 0.131 0.125 0.199 0.217 0.136
2000 0.236 0.123 0.118 0.244 0.267 0.135
2001 0.220 0.112 0.111 0.212 0.210 0.125
2002 0.207 0.125 0.112 0.194 0.191 0.128
2003 0.216 0.136 0.120 0.193 0.193 0.138
2004 0.236 0.149 0.127 0.207 0.228 0.144
2005 0.254 0.155 0.126 0.222 0.238 0.148
2006 0.255 0.153 0.125 0.227 0.252 0.145
2007 0.231 0.144 0.121 0.214 0.234 0.140
2008 0.203 0.137 0.118 0.197 0.181 0.139
2009 0.207 0.144 0.131 0.183 0.167 0.150
2010 0.216 0.151 0.136 0.184 0.186 0.149
         New Issues              Dividend Status          Accounting Performance     
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Also positive income firms perceive some, although rather small, increase in cash holdings 
from 11.7% in 1995 to 14.5% in 2006. Time trend is again positive but statistically 
insignificant. These results show that increase in cash holdings has been especially fast for 
firms with negative income firms but firms with positive net income have also been 
increasing their cash savings. Compared to Bates, Kahle and Stulz (2009), my results are very 
much in line with their findings, even though due to much longer time period, they were able 
to find statistically more significant time trends for increased cash holdings for both income 
sub-groups, but especially for negative income firms.  
 
6.2.3. Precautionary Motive Proxies and Cash Holdings 
 
Next, I move on to examine the effect and scope of each precautionary motive proxy on cash 
holdings. According to McLean (2011), firms with high PREC tend to hold more cash 
compared to firms with lower PREC score. Literature suggests that firms with high industry 
cash flow volatility, high R&D expenses and low dividend payments have the highest 
precautionary motives, i.e. the highest PREC score, to hold excess amounts of cash on their 
balance sheets. Therefore, I investigate whether this hypothesis holds with my data sample by 
investigating each proxy separately in Figure 4. In this section, the levels of cash holdings for 
different precautionary motive proxy quintiles are discussed whereas trends for each proxy 
are examined further in Section 6.5.1. 
Panel A of Figure 4 depicts yearly average cash ratios for sample firms by Cash flow volatility 
quintile. There is clear difference between cash holdings among firms within lowest and 
highest Cash flow volatility quintiles. Furthermore, cash ratios seem to increase rather steadily 
when moving on from lower quintile to a higher quintile. Only difference to this development 
is on the 4
th
 and 5
th
 quintile as firms within Q4 have at times higher cash ratios than firms 
within the highest cash flow volatilities. Thus, increase in cash flow volatility seems to 
increase cash holdings when cash flow volatility is rather low. At higher levels of cash flow 
volatility, firms have already high cash ratios and hence increase in cash flow volatility does 
not have as much significance on cash holdings. 
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A. Cash flow volatility and cash holdings 
 
B. Dividends and cash holdings 
 
C. R&D and cash holdings 
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D. PREC and cash holdings
 
Figure 4 Average Cash Ratios by Exposure to Precautionary Motives 
Figure depicts yearly average cash ratios for all sample firms by precautionary motive quintiles for Cash flow 
volatility, Dividends, R&D and PREC. Cash ratio is calculated as cash and cash equivalents divided by lagged 
total assets. Panel A depicts the relation between the scope of cash flow volatility and cash holdings. Cash flow 
volatility is the average cash flow volatility within each firm’s two-digit SIC code, measured over the past five 
years (at least three years). Panel B depicts the relation between the dividend payments and cash holdings. 
Dividends is paid common dividends divided by lagged total assets. Panel C depicts the relation between R&D 
expenditures and cash holdings.  R&D is research and development expenditures divided by lagged total assets. 
Panel D depicts the relation between PREC and cash holdings. PREC is the first principal component of Cash 
flow volatility, Dividends and R&D. Figure reports that cash ratios are the highest for firms with highest industry 
cash flow volatility, non-dividend payers, highest R&D consumers and firms with highest PREC. The sample 
consists of 41,144 firm year observations during period 1995 – 2010. 
 
 
Firms are divided yearly to quintiles by their level of dividend payments in Panel B of Figure 
4. Q1 represents all firms that do not pay any common dividend on specific year, thus 
including more observations than other quintiles. Main result here is that non-dividend payers 
hold generally more cash than dividend payers as cash ratio for Q1 is higher than for other 
quintiles, except for the two first and last years of sample period. On the other hand, results 
are not entirely straightforward. The rationale for using dividend payment status as 
precautionary motive proxy is that firms who do not pay dividends are probably financially 
more constrained and hence hold higher levels of cash. However, firms that pay the highest 
dividends tend to hold almost as much cash scaled to their assets as non-dividend payers 
(compare Q1 and Q5 in panel B of Figure 4). Thus, this can be interpreted in a way that 
highest dividend paying firms are financially in very good shape and that is why they can also 
afford to pay high dividends.  
48 
 
Yearly average cash ratios for sample firms by R&D quintile are presented in Panel C of 
Figure 4. Q1 represents all firms that do not report any R&D expenses, and as noted before, 
this quintile includes the majority of sample firms. Therefore, I don’t put much emphasis on 
Q1 at this stage, because firms within this quintile probably base their cash holding decisions 
in many other factors besides their R&D expenses and potential precautionary motives due to 
it. Quintiles 2 to 5 give more information about R&D – cash holdings relation. From Q2 to 
Q4 firms seem to steadily increase their cash holdings as they spend more on R&D. After Q4, 
there is a high leap to Q5 meaning that firms that invest to R&D the most have clearly higher 
cash ratios than other companies. This evidence, even with high amount of firms that do not 
report any R&D activity, supports clearly the hypothesis that R&D-intensive companies hold 
more cash. 
Panel D concludes the results discussed above by depicting the relation between 
precautionary motive index PREC and cash holdings. At lower PREC quintiles Q1 to Q4 
there is no notable difference in amount of cash holdings, however supporting the assumption 
that firms with lower precautionary motives hold lower amounts of cash. Quintile 5 on the 
other hand, is clearly above other quintiles especially after 1997. This suggests that firms with 
highest PREC hold more cash than other firms. To summarize, the overall observation is that 
firms with higher precautionary motives, measured as separate proxies or PREC index, hold 
more cash than firms with lower motives for precautionary cash holdings throughout the 
sample period. 
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6.3. Savings from Cash Sources 
 
In this section, I investigate yearly development of different cash sources: Issue, Debt, Cash 
flow and Other. I am interested to examine the popularity of different cash sources among my 
sample firms and to see if there have been some significant trends in their usage. Main results 
discussed here are depicted in Tables 7 and 8 and Figure 5. As reported in Section 6.1., the 
sample of European firms have increased their cash holdings and therefore it is in interest to 
examine which cash sources are mainly used to accumulate more cash on balance sheet. 
 
6.3.1. Yearly Cash Savings Rates 
 
I start by determining yearly cash savings rates for each cash source. In other words, I 
examine how much each cash source has increased company’s cash ratio on average. To 
conduct this, I use the regression model (1) introduced in Section 5.1. : 
ΔCashi = α + β1 Issuei + β2 Debti + β3 Cash flowi + β4 Otheri + β5 Assetsi + εi . (1) 
This regression is run separately for each sample year and coefficient estimates for cash 
sources are presented in Panel A of Table 7. Coefficients are interpreted as cents (or 
percentages) saved from each euro received as cash from a cash source. For example, cash 
savings rate for Issue is 0.362 in 1995, which means that on average firms saved 36.2 cents 
from each euro they received as cash flow from share issuances. The rest of issuance proceeds 
have been used for other purposes during the fiscal year when the issuance was executed. As 
tabulated in Panel A of Table 7 and illustrated in Panel A of Figure 5, firms have highest cash 
savings rates for proceeds received from Issue almost throughout the whole period.  
Savings rate for Debt is rather close to zero the whole time as its peak value is only 3.6 cent 
for each euro in 2002. Moreover, on average, savings rate from debt proceeds has been 
negative every other year during sample period. Interpretation for this is that when firms have 
issued debt, they have basically spent it during the fiscal year when the issuance is executed. 
In addition, they have used cash from other sources as well, thus decreasing their cash ratio 
compared to beginning of the fiscal year. Debt has significantly negative savings rate of -
0.248 in 2000 which differs greatly from results by McLean (2011). That is, McLean shows 
that Debt has actually its (positive) peak value of 0.091 in year 2000 when IT bubble was  
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Table 7 Cash Savings Rates, Capital Raised and Amount of Cash Saved by Cash 
Sources 
Table reports yearly values of cash savings rate, amount of capital raised and amount of cash saved from each 
cash source. Panel A reports the percentage of cash saved from each euro received as cash proceed from the four 
cash sources. Savings rate is the parameter estimate received from following regression that is run for each year 
separately, and where ΔCashi is the dependent variable:  
ΔCashi = α + β1 Issueit + β2 Debtit + β3 Cash flowit + β4 Otherit + β5 Assetsit + εit, (1) 
ΔCashi is the difference between cash at the end of the year (t) and at the beginning of year (t-1) divided by total 
assets at time t. Issue is cash proceeds from share issuances divided by lagged total assets. Debt is cash proceeds 
from additional debt divided by lagged total assets. Cash flow is net income plus amortization and depreciation 
divided by lagged total assets. Other includes all other cash sources, including the sales of assets and 
investments, divided by lagged total assets. Assets is the natural logarithm of lagged total assets. Panel B reports 
the yearly average values for Issue, Debt, Cash flow and Other, and it therefore represents the amount of capital 
raised from each cash source. Panel C reports yearly average values of cash saved (divided by lagged total 
assets) from each cash source. It is constructed by multiplying the yearly savings rate of a cash source in Panel A 
with the amount of capital raised from the same cash source at that year in Panel B. t-Statistics are reported in 
parentheses. * = significant at 10%; ** = significant at 5%; and *** = significant at 1%. The sample consists of 
41,144 firm year observations during the period 1995 – 2010. 
 
 
Year R
2 Intercept Issue Debt Cash flow Other
1995 0.143 -0.022 0.362*** 0.022 0.168*** -0.058
(1.01) (9.61) (0.17) (6.31) (0.32)
1996 0.151 0.037* 0.368*** 0.005 0.045** 0.152
(1.79) (13.87) (0.08) (2.06) (1.27)
1997 0.126 0.131*** 0.344*** -0.012 0.241*** 0.250*
(4.49) (10.85) (0.12) (9.23) (1.84)
1998 0.073 0.267*** 0.286*** -0.044 0.244*** 0.369**
(6.49) (7.14) (0.66) (7.79) (2.14)
1999 0.017 0.455*** 0.163*** -0.087 -0.005 0.327
(5.49) (2.77) (0.80) (-0.08) (1.03)
2000 0.414 0.395*** 0.494*** -0.248*** -0.336*** 0.301
(3.58) (33.60) (2.22) (7.18) (0.98)
2001 0.332 -0.069** 0.548*** 0.000 0.239*** 0.112
(2.46) (33.41) (0.01) (13.17) (1.12)
2002 0.174 -0.046*** 0.276*** 0.036 0.230*** 0.048
(2.75) (14.07) (1.23) (19.11) (0.84)
2003 0.212 -0.040** 0.387*** -0.025 0.227*** 0.109*
(2.54) (24.42) (0.95) (18.91) (1.92)
2004 0.380 0.053** 0.442*** -0.006 0.212*** -0.004
(2.54) (41.28) (0.21) (15.52) (0.06)
2005 0.541 0.022 0.549*** 0.014 0.265*** 0.202**
(0.78) (57.80) (0.52) (15.05) (2.33)
Panel A: Cash savings rates
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Table 7 (continued) 
 
 
Year R
2 Intercept Issue Debt Cash flow Other
2006 0.471 0.041 0.544*** -0.028 0.335*** 0.128
(1.33) (53.05) (0.96) (17.89) (1.30)
2007 0.35 -0.054** 0.464*** -0.03 0.209*** 0.349***
(2.02) (42.15) (1.30) (11.78) (4.03)
2008 0.210 -0.107*** 0.360*** 0.029* 0.248*** 0.098
(6.26) (25.11) (1.59) (20.04) (1.35)
2009 0.204 -0.078*** 0.368*** 0.044* 0.241*** 0.090
(5.40) (23.46) (1.64) (20.62) (1.37)
2010 0.465 -0.032** 0.502*** -0.008 0.189*** -0.030
(1.88) (52.09) (0.34) (15.08) (0.54)
Mean 0.266 0.060 0.404 -0.021 0.172 0.153
Panel A: Cash savings rates
Year Issue Debt Cash flow Other
1995 0.014 0.039 0.104 0.020
1996 0.024 0.048 0.104 0.024
1997 0.023 0.067 0.113 0.027
1998 0.027 0.081 0.104 0.027
1999 0.037 0.091 0.091 0.029
2000 0.208 0.096 0.056 0.032
2001 0.045 0.062 0.037 0.028
2002 0.024 0.040 0.030 0.028
2003 0.030 0.034 0.035 0.028
2004 0.068 0.039 0.057 0.031
2005 0.112 0.072 0.053 0.034
2006 0.121 0.075 0.055 0.030
2007 0.093 0.073 0.055 0.028
2008 0.040 0.062 0.032 0.023
2009 0.031 0.023 0.020 0.021
2010 0.058 0.032 0.036 0.024
Mean 0.060 0.058 0.061 0.027
Panel B: Capital raised
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Table 7 (continued) 
 
 
heavily affecting the financing decision of U.S. companies. Moreover, it seems that European 
firms have had lower propensity to save Debt proceeds in general compared to U.S. firms 
who were reported to have positive average savings rate for Debt
11
 (McLean, 2011). Steep 
decrease in savings rate for Debt at 2000 is offset by dramatic year-to-year increase in Issue’s 
savings rate which triples from 1999 to 2000.  To sum up, firms seem to issue debt in order to 
finance short-term operations and investments, not for the purpose of cash savings. 
Firms have remained their cash savings rate from internal cash flow at a rather steady level if 
years 1999 – 2000 are excluded. Similarly to Debt, large dip in savings rate for Cash flow is 
                                                 
11
 There seems to be difference in average Debt savings rates between European sample used in this thesis and 
the U.S. sample used in McLean (2011). During the period 1971 – 2008, McLean reports 11 yearly average 
values that are below zero. During period 1995 – 2008 U.S. firms had only three negative average savings rates, 
whereas I report eight negative average savings rates for the same period for European firms.  
Year Issue Debt Cash flow Other
1995 0.005 0.001 0.018 -0.001
1996 0.009 0.000 0.005 0.004
1997 0.008 -0.001 0.027 0.007
1998 0.008 -0.004 0.025 0.010
1999 0.006 -0.008 0.000 0.009
2000 0.103 -0.024 -0.019 0.010
2001 0.025 0.000 0.009 0.003
2002 0.007 0.001 0.007 0.001
2003 0.012 -0.001 0.008 0.003
2004 0.030 0.000 0.012 0.000
2005 0.061 0.001 0.014 0.007
2006 0.066 -0.002 0.018 0.004
2007 0.043 -0.002 0.011 0.010
2008 0.014 0.002 0.008 0.002
2009 0.011 0.001 0.005 0.002
2010 0.029 0.000 0.007 -0.001
Mean 0.027 -0.002 0.010 0.004
Panel C: Cash saved from each source of cash
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probably due to high investment phase in the turn of the decade. According to traditional 
pecking order theory (Myers and Majluf, 1984), firms should first use internal cash sources to 
finance investments before debt and equity. This theory seems to hold at least when 
interpreting Panel A of Figure 5: during high investment boom in year 2000, firms have used 
all their internal cash flows during that year to finance growth and they have also needed to 
spend all proceeds from debt issues as already discussed. Therefore, in order to balance this 
deficit in cash savings, firms have saved a large portion of share issuance proceeds.  
Savings rate from Other fluctuates heavily during the whole time period. However, generally 
firms seem to save much of the proceeds they receive from sale of investments etc. Savings 
rate probably changes according to size of random cash flows. In other words, firms probably 
save the larger portion of cash proceeds the larger the one-time cash flow is. This can be seen 
again in year 2000 when many firm received also income from selling investments and large 
share of this income was not spent immediately. 
To conclude, compared to other cash sources, firms save clearly much larger portion from 
share issuance proceeds. Average savings rate from issuance proceeds is 40.4% whereas only 
17.2% of internal cash flow proceeds are used to increase cash holdings during period 1995 -
2010
12
. Propensity to save debt issuance proceeds is basically zero, even negative on average. 
Same evidence can be seen from significance of different cash sources on ΔCash: Issue 
coefficient has on average a t-value of 27.78, compared to Debt, Cash flow and Other that 
have average t-values of 0.80, 12.49 and 1.40, respectively. Thus, it is clear that firms have 
the highest propensity to save issue proceeds over other cash sources. However, high savings 
rate might not have significant economic meaning if amount raised from share issuances is 
very small. Therefore, amounts raised from each cash source are investigated in the following 
section.    
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
12
 Year 2000 has large negative effect on average savings rates for Debt and Cash flow. Nevertheless, Issue has 
higher savings rate each year compared Debt and Issue. Other has the highest savings rate in 1998 and 1999, 
however, Other is a more random cash source than Issue, Debt and Cash flow and therefore it is not further 
discussed here. 
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6.3.2. Yearly Sources of Cash 
 
Panel B of Table 7 reports yearly mean values for Issue, Debt, Cash flow and Other
13
. Same 
results are also graphed in Panel B of Figure 5. In other words, mean values for cash sources 
represent average cash proceeds scaled by lagged total assets and therefore this method shows 
information about how much firms have raised money from different sources each year. 
Issue has perceived a dramatic increase from 0.014 in 1995 to 0.121 in 2006, after which it 
again decreased during financial crisis. As expected, highest value of 0.208 for Issue is 
observed in year 2000 when IT companies were able to raise substantial amounts of cash from 
share issuances. Therefore, year 2000 also increases the average for the whole sample period, 
because if year 2000 was excluded, the mean of 0.060 would decrease to 0.050.  
Debt has been basically rather steady cash source for sample firms throughout the time period 
preceding financial crisis as it fluctuates between 0.034 and 0.096 during 1995 – 2006 time 
period. As it is the case with Issue, Debt has its peak value of capital raised in year 2000.  
Mean for yearly values is 0.058, i.e. 5.8% of assets. 
Cash flow shows that firms are generating less cash internally. Average value for cash flow is 
0.103 in 1995 – 1999 but only 0.046 in 2000 – 2006. However, for the whole sample period, 
the average value of 0.061 is very close to Issue and Debt. Other is clearly the smallest and 
steadiest cash source in terms of capital raised. Moreover, financial crisis seems not to have 
very high effect on Other. To summarize, firms have been using Issue, Debt and Cash flow 
for raising capital surprisingly evenly when interpreting the average values for the whole time 
period. 
 
6.3.3. Yearly Amounts of Cash Saved 
 
Results in Panel C of Table 7 are generated from values in Panels A and B and data is also 
plotted in Panel C of Figure 5. Panel C reports the yearly amounts of cash saved as percentage 
of lagged total assets for each four cash sources. Panel A reported yearly cash savings rates 
and Panel B described yearly mean values for capital raised scaled by lagged total assets. 
                                                 
13
 Mean values in the last row of panel B in Table 7 are average values of yearly means. Therefore, figures on 
the last row differ from mean values presented earlier in summary statistics table (Table 3) that treats the sample 
as a whole. 
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Thus, yearly amount of cash saved is received from multiplying yearly cash saving rate by 
amount of capital raised. For example, for average firm in 1995, cash savings from share 
issuance is equal to 0.362 x 0.014 = 0.005, i.e. 0.5% of its assets. 
 
 
A. Cash savings rates
 
 
B. Capital raised
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C. Cash saved
 
Figure 5 Graphical Presentation of Table 7 
Figure depicts developments of cash savings rates, amounts of capital raised and amounts of cash saved from 
each four cash sources during the period 1995 – 2010. Panel A plots the coefficients received from the following 
regression model that is run separately for each sample year:  
ΔCashi = α + β1 Issueit + β2 Debtit + β3 Cash flowit + β4 Otherit + β5 Assetsit + εit,  
where Issue is cash proceeds from share issuances divided by lagged total assets. Debt is cash proceeds from 
additional debt divided by lagged total assets. Cash flow is net income plus amortization and depreciation 
divided by lagged total assets. Other includes all other cash sources, including the sales of assets and 
investments, divided by lagged total assets. Assets is natural logarithm of lagged total assets. Panel B depicts 
yearly average values for Issue, Debt, Cash flow and Other. Panel C plots the yearly amounts of cash saved from 
each four cash sources. Amount of cash saved is a product of measures in Panel A and Panel B.  Panel C shows 
that Issue has been the primary cash source for cash savings since year 2000. The sample consists of 41,144 firm 
year observations during the period 1995 – 2010. 
 
Most important finding in Panel C is the increased cash saving from Issue during the time 
period. Compared to savings of 0.5% per assets in 1995, the figure has increased to 6.6% per 
assets in 2006, i.e. over 13 times larger in 12 years. Moreover, the average cash savings was 
0.7% in period 1995 – 1999 but as high as 4.3% in 2000 – 2006, and still 3.3% if peak year 
2000 is excluded.  
As cash savings from Issue have increased clearly, Debt has remained close to zero all the 
time and savings from internally generated cash have seemed to be decreasing. Cash saved 
from cash flow is at the same level, in 1.8%, at 1995 and 2006. However, 1990s average for 
Cash flow is 1.5% per assets, whereas cash savings have halved in 2000 – 2006 to 0.7% per 
assets.  
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When examining the average amount of cash saved to total assets for the whole sample 
period, Issue is clearly the main source for cash savings with mean value of 2.7% compared to 
values of -0.2%, 1.0% and 0.4% for Debt, Cash flow and Other, respectively. Thus, on 
average, firms have saved more cash from Issue than from other cash sources altogether 
during the period 1995 – 2010. 
 
6.3.4. Statistical Tests for Cash Source Time Trends 
 
In Section 6.1., I concluded that there has been statistically significant increase in median 
cash ratios for European firms. In Sections 6.3.1. – 6.3.3. I discussed the development and 
scope of cash saving rates, capital raised and amount of cash saved for each cash source. In 
this section, I follow McLean’s (2011) method by reporting statistical tests for time trends 
showed in Panels A – C of Table 7 and in Figure 5.  Time trend tests reported here are done 
for time period 1995 – 2006 thus excluding the effect of financial crisis, which would distort 
the assessment of long term trend
14
. This development can also be seen from Figure 5, which 
shows that many increasing trend lines turn to decreasing after year 2006.  
Table 8 reports estimates of trends in the time series that are reported in Table 7. Each 
variable is regressed on time variable, which is equal to one in first sample year 1995, and 12 
in year 2006 which is considered as the last year before financial crisis. Variables are 
regressed with zero to four autoregressive lag terms depending on their partial 
autocorrelation. With these assumptions, parameter estimate Trend is estimation for average 
yearly increase (decrease) in dependent variable.   
Main result in Panel A of Table 8 is that Issue is the only cash source that has had increasing 
trend in cash savings rate. Estimation for Trend means that cash savings rate from share 
issuance proceeds has increased on average 1.8% every year from 1995 to 2006. T-statistics 
shows that this increase is significant at 5% level. In turn, Debt, Cash flow and Other have no 
statistically significant trend in savings rates during the same time period. 
Panel B reports that none of the cash sources in terms of capital raised has perceived a trend 
that would significantly differ from zero. However, t-statistics for Issue is again the highest 
                                                 
14
 Tests were run for whole time period 1995 – 2010 as well but results were mostly insignificant and thus are 
not reported here.  
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and almost significant, thus indicating that firms have increased their share issuance - cash 
collection more than raising capital from other sources. Moreover, trends for Debt and Cash 
flow have negative (although insignificant) coefficients, which supports the evidence already 
discussed in Section 6.3.2., i.e. firms have not increased their debt issuances although internal 
cash flows have decreased. Thus, decreasing internal cash flows have been replaced by 
issuing equity instead of increasing leverage.  
 
Table 8 Time Trend Tests for Cash Sources 
Table reports statistical time series tests for yearly average cash savings rates, capital raised and amount of cash 
saved for each four cash sources, as reported in Table 7 and Figure 5. Cash savings rates represent the 
coefficients received from the following regression model that is run separately for each sample year:  
ΔCashi = α + β1 Issueit + β2 Debtit + β3 Cash flowit + β4 Otherit + β5 Assetsit + εit,  
where Issue is cash proceeds from share issuances divided by lagged total assets. Debt is cash proceeds from 
additional debt divided by lagged total assets. Cash flow is net income plus amortization and depreciation 
divided by lagged total assets. Other includes all other cash sources, including the sales of assets and 
investments, divided by lagged total assets. Assets is natural logarithm of lagged total assets.  Time trend 
coefficient is received by regressing each cash source variable on a time variable and sufficient amount of lag 
terms in order to control for autoregression. Panel A reports trends in the yearly averages of cash savings rates, 
Panel B reports trends in the yearly averages of capital raised from each cash source, and Panel C reports trends 
for amounts of cash saved from each cash sources. t-Statistics are reported in parentheses. * = significant at 10%; 
** = significant at 5%; and *** = significant at 1%. Durbin-Watson statistics are reported at the bottom of each 
table. The test sample excludes the effects of recent financial crisis on potential time trends, and includes 27,487 
firm-year observations during the period 1995 – 2006. 
 
 
Issue Debt Cash flow Other
Trend 0.018** 0.001 0.017 -0.012
(2.00) (0.15) (1.13) (0.52)
Constant 0.279*** -0.038 0.046 0.271
(4.16) (0.77) (0.42) (1.08)
Lag 1 0.224
(0.63)
Lag 2 0.412
(0.78)
Lag 3 -0.661*
(1.80)
Years 12 12 12 12
Durbin-Watson 1.94 1.57 1.76 3.11
Panel A: Trends in cash savings rates
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Table 8 (continued) 
 
 
 
 
Issue Debt Cash flow Other
Trend 0.007 -0.004 -0.003 0.001
(1.61) (1.24) (1.18) (0.99)
Constant 0.013 0.158*** 0.059 0.035**
(0.40) (2.90) (1.49) (2.01)
Lag 1 0.133 1.226*** 0.094
(0.26) (4.09) (0.18)
Lag 2 -0.228 -0.741** -0.480
(0.35) (2.22) (0.82)
Lag 3 -0.196 0.038
(0.30) (0.09)
Lag 4 -0.663
(1.10)
Years 12 12 12 12
Durbin-Watson 2.00 2.66 2.58 2.22
Panel B: Trends in cash sources
Issue Debt Cash flow Other
Trend 0.004* 0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(1.79) (0.28) (0.20) (0.66)
Constant 0.000 -0.004 0.012 0.010
(0.01) (0.92) (1.49) (1.23)
Lag 1 0.155
(0.39)
Lag 2 0.274
(0.49)
Lag 3 -0.588
(1.39)
Years 12 12 12 12
Durbin-Watson 2.02 1.60 1.51 2.95
Panel C: Trends in cash saved
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Panel C reports the main findings of this section in explaining the main source for increased 
cash holding. Namely, as shown in Panel C, Issue is the only cash source that has perceived 
increasing time trend for the amount of cash saved during investigated time period 1995 – 
2006. Slope coefficient for Trend is 0.004 which means that, on average, firms have increased 
the amount of cash saved from share issuances (scaled by lagged total assets) by 0.4% each 
year. T-statistics for Issue trend is 1.79 and thus significant at 10% level. Cash savings from 
Debt, Cash flow and Other, have remained statistically at the same level during time period 
1995 – 2006 as none of these sources have any trends significantly different from zero. 
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6.4. Persistence of Cash Savings 
 
In previous sections, I concluded that firms have high propensity to save cash proceeds 
received from equity issuances. In this section, I further examine whether these savings are 
temporary or persistent. Panel A of Table 7 reported that average cash savings rate for yearly 
sample period share issuances was 0.404 when dependent variable was ΔCash (i.e. casht – 
casht-1 divided by assetst-1). However, it could be that firms issue shares to finance projects that 
unfold over several years and Issue in equation (1) would represent savings for earmarked 
investments, not for precautionary savings. In order to investigate this possibility, I calculate 
savings rates from Issue and other cash source coefficients for a longer time window. 
Panel A of Table 9 reports Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions using the same method as 
in Panel A of Table 7 but this time using additional dependent variables ΔCasht+1,  ΔCasht+2 
and  ΔCasht+3, that measure differences between cash at time t+1, t+2 and t+3, and cash at 
beginning of year (t-1). Results for dependent variable ΔCash are also further reported here 
for comparison and figures are the same as means in Panel A of Table 7
15
.  
Results in Panel A of Table 9 show that Issue coefficient does not shrink as the time goes by. 
On the contrary, despite a very small decrease between ΔCash and ΔCasht+1, the coefficient 
actually increases significantly for years t+2 and t+3. Cash savings rate for Issue is 0.404 for 
the financial year of the issue, and increases to 0.515 for the financial year t+3 after issuance 
year. Therefore, the conclusion is that cash proceeds saved from share issuances are not only 
persistent, but are also increased during subsequent years of the issuance. Hence, savings 
from share issuances are not just temporary savings for earmarked investment projects 
unfolding in several years after the issue, but firms tend to save high portion of cash proceeds 
for precautionary purposes.  
At the same setting, Debt has no significant coefficient at any point of time which means that 
savings rate from debt proceeds are not significantly different from zero. This suggests that 
debt proceeds are mainly used very quickly for financing short-term operations and 
investments as concluded before. 
 
                                                 
15
 T-statistics reported by cash sources for ΔCash differ from the average yearly t-statistics that were discussed in 
Section 6.3.1. T-values reported in Table 9 are calculated from yearly Fama-MacBeth means and their standard 
deviations (not reported). 
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Table 9 Fama-MacBeth Regressions for Persistence of Savings Rates by Cash Sources 
Panel A reports results from Fama-MacBeth (1973) regressions in order to report the persistence of cash savings 
rate within each four cash sources. Cash savings rates represent the coefficients received from the following 
regression model that is run separately for each sample year:  
ΔCashi = α + β1 Issueit + β2 Debtit + β3 Cash flowit + β4 Otherit + β5 Assetsit + εit,  
Dependent variable ΔCashi is the difference between cash at the end of years t, t+1, t+2 and t+3 and cash at the 
beginning of year t-1.  Issue is cash proceeds from share issuances divided by lagged total assets. Debt is cash 
proceeds from additional debt divided by lagged total assets. Cash flow is net income plus amortization and 
depreciation divided by lagged total assets. Other includes all other cash sources, including the sales of assets 
and investments, divided by lagged total assets. Assets is natural logarithm of lagged total assets. Panel B reports 
the average values of changes in cash for issue quartiles and Issue groups are formed each year. Issue quartile 1 
includes all zero-issuers and quartiles 2, 3 and 4 include firms with positive Issue values, and quartile 4 includes 
the firms with highest Issue. Panel C is constructed similarly to Panel B but now the changes of Log(Assets) 
within Issue groups are investigated. t-Statistics are reported in parentheses. * = significant at 10%; ** = 
significant at 5%; and *** = significant at 1%. The sample consists of 41,144 firm year observations during 
period 1995 – 2010.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Δ Cash Δ Cash t+1 Δ Cash t+2 Δ Cash t+3
Intercept 0.060 0.368*** 0.608*** 0.750***
(1.41) (2.79) (3.59) (8.47)
Issue 0.404*** 0.399*** 0.477*** 0.515***
(14.63) (9.88) (6.74) (6.26)
Debt -0.021 0.058 0.078 0.036
(1.22) (1.35) (1.38) (0.98)
Cash flow 0.172*** 0.154* 0.240*** 0.339***
(4.35) (1.77) (4.02) (6.85)
Other 0.153*** 0.228** 0.325* 0.309*
(4.51) (2.23) (1.94) (1.81)
Assets -0.004** -0.037* -0.030*** -0.037***
(2.32) (1.72) (3.69) (4.57)
R
2
0.27 0.16 0.10 0.07
Years 16 15 14 13
Panel A. Coefficient estimates
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Table 9 (continued) 
 
 
When it comes to internal cash sources, firms have significant and mostly increasing savings 
rates for cash proceeds received from Cash flow and Other. Especially, coefficient for Cash 
flow increases relatively even more than it does for Issue, since it nearly doubles from 0.172 
in first regression to 0.339 in fourth regression. However, savings rate for internal cash 
sources are always lower than the coefficient for Issue in all four regressions. As reported 
earlier in Panel B of Table 7, firms raise basically the same amount of cash from share 
issuances as they generate from internal cash flow (mean for capital raised scaled by lagged 
assets was 0.060 for Issue and 0.061 for Cash flow during the sample period). Therefore, as 
the savings rate for Issue is larger than for Cash flow also throughout the three years window 
after the cash is raised, I can conclude that Issue is the main source for precautionary cash 
savings. 
In order to further investigate the cash accumulation of share issuers in the years subsequent 
to the issuance year, I sort firms into four Issue groups every year in Panel B of Table 9. Issue 
quartile 1 includes all firms that do not make share issuances on particular year, and quartile 4 
includes the firms with highest share issuances scaled by their assets. The average values for 
Issue quartile Δ Cash Δ Cash t+1 Δ Cash t+2 Δ Cash t+3
1 0.020 0.065 0.096 0.120
2 0.001 0.017 0.029 0.045
3 0.097 0.152 0.200 0.220
4 0.173 0.222 0.290 0.297
Difference 0.153*** 0.157*** 0.193*** 0.177***
(23.05) (17.56) (15.77) (15.20)
Issue quartile Δ Assets Δ Assetst+1 Δ Assetst+2 Δ Assetst+3
1 0.117 0.491 0.642 0.899
2 0.064 0.177 0.315 0.483
3 0.135 0.385 0.590 0.829
4 0.554 1.044 1.612 2.055
Difference 0.437 *** 0.553 *** 0.970 *** 1.156***
(31.02) (18.61) (20.19) (19.77)
Panel B: Growth in cash across issue groups
Panel C: Growth in assets across issue groups
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the three Issue groups that make issuances are 0.001, 0.010 and 0.489 (not reported in the 
tables), which tells that only the firms in highest Issue quartile make large issuances. For 
quartiles 2 and 3, the issuances are very small compared to their assets. Moreover, average 
cash flows for all Issue quartiles from 1 to 4 are 0.064, 0.080, 0.099 and -0.051, respectively. 
Therefore, non-issuers and small issuers have clearly positive internal cash flows on average, 
whereas largest issuers are usually unable to produce positive cash flows internally.  
Results reported in Panel B of Table 9 show that largest issuers accumulate significantly more 
cash compared to non-issuers in issuance years, and increasingly in subsequent years after the 
issuances. However, it is notable that all Issue quartiles accumulate cash constantly as each 
group has larger and positive changes in cash year after year when compared to cash balances 
at time t-1. Panel B reports the absolute differences between Issue quartiles 1 and 4 in the last 
row, and shows that difference between high-issuers and non-issuers increases as the change 
is cash measurement horizon increases to t+2. Difference decreases a bit between ΔCasht+2 
and ΔCasht+3. Thus, the overall conclusion here is that largest issuers constantly accumulate 
more cash compared to non-issuers. 
Literature suggests that the reason for high-issuers’ continuous and high cash accumulation is 
due to target cash to assets ratios that firms want to maintain for precautionary reasons, or 
equity might be increased in order to retain the optimal capital structure (see e.g. Myers, 
1984; Bradley, Gregg and Kim, 1984; and Opler et al., 1999). In this setting, firms would 
need more cash if their assets were growing fast due to firm’s high growth phase. Panel C of 
Table 9 supports this argument as high-issuers have significantly higher growth in assets 
compared to non-issuers. Further investigation of target cash ratios is out of the scope of this 
study, but results discussed in this section show some characteristics that are familiar for 
high-issuers: they accumulate high amounts of cash; they are usually fast growing firms in 
terms of their total assets; and have usually negative cash flows.  
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6.5. Precautionary Motives and the Share Issuance – Cash Savings Relation 
 
In previous section, I concluded that firms have had increasing trend in savings rate for share 
issuance proceeds. Next, I investigate whether precautionary motive proxies have experienced 
similar trends and could therefore explain the increase in share issuance cash savings. To 
conduct this test, I first depict the development of each precautionary motive proxy 
graphically and then run statistical tests to conclude whether proxies have significant trends 
during the sample period.  
 
6.5.1. Statistical Tests for Precautionary Motive Time Trends 
 
Figure 6 depicts yearly average values for each precautionary motive proxy for whole sample 
during years 1995 – 2010. Statistical time trends tests with autocorrelation lag terms are 
reported in Table 10. Trend test from Panel A of Table 8 for Issue-cash savings rate is further 
reported in the first column for comparison; if a precautionary proxy has had a significant 
trend during the period it could support the potential cointegration with increased share 
issuance – cash savings. Results in Table 10 are calculated for average values during 1995 – 
2006 in order to make tests consistent with results in Table 8.  
Average (logarithmic) cash flow volatility is -3.26 in 1995 and peaks at -2.30 in 2004, which 
indicates that cash flow volatility has increased during the sample period. However, Cash 
flow volatility has remained at seemingly steady level during 2000s and therefore trend is not 
very clear. Statistical test in third column of Table 10 shows that Cash flow volatility has had 
positive trend with coefficient 0.047. T-value for time trend is 1.42 and is therefore not quite 
significant at 10% level. However, compared to tests for other proxies, Cash flow volatility 
seems to have most significant trend and might therefore be the best proxy to correlate with 
increased share issuance – cash savings. 
Dividend payments have clearly decreased during 1990s but remained rather steady 
thereafter. On average, firms paid yearly dividends of 2.47% scaled by total assets during 
1995 – 1999, whereas the average figure has been 1.52% during 2000s. Fourth column in 
Table 10 reports that, regardless clear decrease of dividend payments after 1990s, there is no 
significant time trend for Dividends. Coefficient for time trend is negative but low t-value of 
1.03 shows no statistical significance in the trend. 
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Figure 6 Yearly Average Values for Precautionary Motive Proxies 
Figure describes the development of yearly mean values for each precautionary motive proxy. Cash flow 
volatility is the average cash flow volatility within each firm’s two-digit SIC code, measured over the past five 
years (at least three years). Dividends is paid common dividends divided by lagged total assets. R&D is research 
and development expenditures divided by lagged total assets. PREC is the first principal component of Cash 
flow volatility, Dividends and R&D. The sample consists of 41,144 firm year observations during the period 
1995 – 2010. 
 
Graphic depiction for R&D in Figure 6 does not provide a clear picture whether firms have 
had continuously increasing trend in R&D expenditures. Although average R&D has clearly 
increased during the end of 1990s, it has been fluctuating up and down during the 2000s. 
Average R&D has increased from 0.016 in 1995 to peak value of 0.042 in 2000. At 2006, 
value for R&D expenses to total assets was again decreased to 0.031. Fifth column of Table 
10 reports that there is no observable trend in average R&D values. Coefficient for time trend 
is just slightly positive with low and insignificant t-value 1.06.  
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Average yearly values depicted for PREC in Figure 6 supports the development of three 
precautionary proxies discussed above. There seems to be rather steep slope for PREC during 
1990s because of increase in Cash flow volatility and R&D and corresponding decrease in 
Dividends at the same time. Value for PREC is -0.91 in 1995 and peaks at 0.53 in 2004, and 
decreases thereafter. Thus, investigating only time period 2000 – 2006, the trend for PREC is 
not as clearly increasing as it was for 1990s. Even with mostly increasing average values 
during 1995 – 2006, statistical test does not still report any significant increasing time trend 
for PREC. Although coefficient for trend is as high as 0.051, very low t-value of 0.62 does 
not support statistically significant time trend for the dependent variable.  
 
Table 10 Time Trend Tests for Precautionary Motive Proxies 
Table reports statistical time series tests for yearly average values for each precautionary motive proxy. Cash 
flow volatility is the average cash flow volatility within each firm’s two-digit SIC code, measured over the past 
five years (at least three years). Dividends is paid common dividends divided by lagged total assets. R&D is 
research and development expenditures divided by lagged total assets. PREC is the first principal component of 
Cash flow volatility, Dividends and R&D. Time trend coefficient is received by regressing each precautionary 
motive proxy on a time variable and sufficient amount of lag terms in order to control for autoregression. t-
Statistics are reported in parentheses. * = significant at 10%; ** = significant at 5%; and *** = significant at 1%. 
Durbin-Watson statistics are reported at the bottom of the table. The sample excludes the effects of recent 
financial crisis on potential time trends, and includes 27,487 firm-year observations during period 1995 – 2006. 
 
 
Results discussed above don’t report significant support on trends in precautionary proxies. 
Even though graphical descriptions in Figure 6 suggest a presence of unit root for some 
proxies, statistical tests controlled with autoregressive lag terms state otherwise. Cash flow 
Trend 0.018** 0.047 -0.001 0.001 0.051
(2.00) (1.42) (1.03) (1.06) (0.62)
Constant 0.279*** -1.923* 0.015 0.022*** -0.387
(4.16) (1.95) (1.34) (2.81) -0.55
Lag 1 0.934*** 1.099*** 0.103** 1.217***
(3.86) (2.94) (2.13) (3.17)
Lag 2 0.194 -0.658* -0.620** -0.618
(0.53) (1.86) (1.96) (1.43)
Lag 3 -0.700**
(2.47)
Years 12 12 12 12 12
Durbin-Watson 1.94 2.32 2.43 1.64 2.55
Issue 
coefficient      
Cash Flow 
Volatility
Dividends R&D PREC
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volatility is basically the only proxy that had almost significant t-value. Moreover, because 
Dividends and R&D have clearly insignificant time trends, t-value for PREC is also very low. 
In order to further examine the possible relation between different precautionary proxies and 
share issuance – cash savings, I run regressions for their interaction terms in next section. 
 
6.5.2. Fixed Effects Regression for Precautionary Motive – Share Issuance Interaction 
 
Thus far, I have assessed share issuance – cash savings and precautionary motives separately. 
In Section 6.3.4., I concluded that European firms have increased their cash savings from 
share issuances but no significant trend was found for savings from other cash sources. 
However, in the previous section results reported in Table 10 don’t bring much support for the 
hypothesis that precautionary motives had increased significantly and could therefore explain 
the increase in share issuance – cash savings. In other words, cointegration between 
precautionary motive proxies and share issuance – cash savings received somewhat 
ambiguous support in the previous section. In this section, I further investigate the interaction 
between Issue coefficient and precautionary motive proxies in order to find concluding 
evidence for the hypothesized relation between precautionary motives and cash savings from 
share issuances. 
In order to test the hypothesis that increased precautionary motives would have caused the 
increase in share issuance – cash savings, I re-estimate Equation (1) in panel regression with 
firm- and year-fixed effects. Furthermore, interaction term between Issue and each 
precautionary motive proxy is added to the model thus widening Equation (1) to Equation (4) 
as presented in Section 5.3: 
 
ΔCashi = αi + at + β1 Issueit + β2 Debtit + β3 Cash flowit + β4 Otherit + 
 β5 Assetsit +β6 PrecProxyit + βn PrecProxyit x Issueit + εit ,  (4) 
 
where αi represents each firm’s own intercept. As explained for example in Mullainathan and 
Scharfstein (2001), Zhou (2001) and McLean (2011), the framework of firm-fixed effects 
relies on within-firm changes over time in explanatory variables to explain within-firm 
changes over time in the dependent variable (i.e. ΔCash). Therefore, the coefficient of 
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interaction term PrecProxyit x Issueit tests if changes in firm’s precautionary motives cause 
changes in firm’s cash savings from share issuances over time. 
Results for the regressions presented in Equation (4) are reported in Table 11. In addition to 
PREC, separate regressions are run for Issue interaction terms between Cash flow volatility, 
Dividends and R&D as well in order to examine the effect of changes in different 
precautionary motives on share issuance – cash savings within firms. Table 11 reports the 
results for the period 1995 – 2006 and including years 2007 – 2010 to calculations doesn’t 
dramatically change the results (not reported). Addition of financial crisis however decreases 
the significance of all interaction terms and especially interaction term R&D x Issue is 
statistically insignificant if period 2007 – 2010 is included, whereas its coefficient is 
significant at 10% level for period 1995 – 2006. In order to fully support the Hypothesis 4 
presented in Section 3, interaction term should be positive for Cash flow volatility, R&D and 
PREC, and negative for Dividends.  
Regression (2) in Table 11 reports the interaction term for Issue and Cash flow volatility. Its 
coefficient is positive 0.250 with significant t-value 3.37. Therefore, result shows that 
increased industry cash flow volatility increases firm’s propensity to save larger amount of 
proceeds received from share issuances. Negative, although not significant coefficient for 
Cash flow volatility indicates that increased cash flow volatility decreases firm’s cash 
holdings as such.  
Interaction term for Dividends is presented in regression (3). Coefficient for Dividends is 
negative -0.327 as expected although insignificant: firm that increases its dividend payments 
holds more cash. As discussed, firm that is able to pay higher dividends is usually in good 
financial health and therefore has no need to hold as high cash buffers compared to non-
dividend payers. Surprising result is reported for the sign of coefficient of Dividends x Issue 
interaction term. Positive coefficient of 0.991 for the interaction term indicates that when 
firms increase their dividend payments, they also increase their cash savings from share 
issuances. However, interaction term has a very low t-value of 0.39 and hence the conclusion 
is that changes in dividend payments have no significant effect on share issuance – cash 
savings on a firm-level. Moreover, as discussed by McLean (2011) the reasoning behind 
dividends as precautionary motive as such is somewhat ambiguous. 
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Table 11 Precautionary Motives and Share Issuance – Cash Savings 
Table reports the results from firm- and year-fixed effects for the following regression model: 
ΔCashi = αi + at + β1 Issueit + β2 Debtit + β3 Cash flowit + β4 Otherit + β5 Assetsit +β6 PrecProxyit + βn 
PrecProxyit x Issueit + εit ,  
where αi represents each firm’s own intercept. Issue is cash proceeds from share issuances divided by lagged 
total assets. Debt is cash proceeds from additional debt divided by lagged total assets. Cash flow is net income 
plus amortization and depreciation divided by lagged total assets. Other includes all other cash sources, 
including the sales of assets and investments, divided by lagged total assets. Assets is natural logarithm of lagged 
total assets. PrecProxy stands for precautionary motives: Cash flow volatility, Dividends, R&D and PREC. Cash 
flow volatility (CF Vol) is the average cash flow volatility within each firm’s two-digit SIC code, measured over 
the past five years (at least three years). Dividends is paid common dividends divided by lagged total assets.  
R&D is research and development expenditures divided by lagged total assets. PREC is the first principal 
component of Cash flow volatility, Dividends and R&D. PrecProxy x Issue is an interaction term between a 
precautionary motive proxy and Issue. Standard errors are estimated by clustering on firm. t-Statistics are 
reported in parentheses. * = significant at 10%; ** = significant at 5%; and *** = significant at 1%. The sample 
excludes the effects of recent financial crisis, and includes 27,487 firm-year observations during period 1995 – 
2006. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Issue 0.505*** 1.179*** 0.396** 0.387*** 0.477***
(8.86) (6.14) (2.38) (3.23) (7.82)
Debt -0.040 0.061 0.078* 0.118 -0.025
(1.21) (0.93) (1.89) (1.15) (0.73)
Cash Flow 0.103 0.093 0.295*** 0.071 0.082***
(0.91) (1.36) (3.58) (0.33) (0.67)
Other 0.190** 0.071 0.396** 0.554 0.168*
(2.03) (0.39) (2.21) (1.40) (1.67)
Assets 0.012** 0.013 0.015 0.076* 0.011*
(2.09) (1.41) (1.33) (1.64) (1.89)
CF Vol -0.032
(1.59)
CF Vol x Issue 0.250***
(3.37)
Dividends -0.327
(1.38)
Div x Issue 0.991
(0.39)
R&D 0.089
(0.18)
R&D x Issue 1.130*
(1.85)
PREC -0.021*
(1.85)
PREC x Issue 0.055***
(2.61)
R
2
0.18 0.49 0.55 0.21 0.16
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Regression (4) in Table 11 reports results for R&D x Issue interaction. Coefficient of 1.130 
for the interaction is clearly positive and significant at 10% level. Thus, increased R&D 
expenditures have similar kind of positive effect on share issuance – cash savings as Cash 
flow volatility: firms seem to gather more cash from issuance proceeds in order to secure 
continuous R&D efforts. Coefficient for R&D is not statistically significant from zero 
indicating that increase in R&D as such does not lead to increase in individual firm’s cash 
balance.  
Final column in Table 11 summarizes the results discussed above by showing positive and 
significant coefficient for PREC x Issue interaction term. Thus, even though interaction for 
dividends and share issuances got an unexpected (though insignificant) sign, PREC suggests 
that firms with increased industry cash flow volatility and R&D expenditures perceive 
increase in share issuance – cash savings. The unexpected sign of Div x Issue decreases the t-
statistics of PREC’s interaction term somewhat, and usage of dividends as precautionary 
motive proxy does not receive support in light of these results. 
As a robustness check, I have run similar tests to Table 11 in Appendix 3 using four 
geographically restricted sub-samples (France, Germany, UK and Nordics) in order to 
investigate whether interaction terms behave similarly in different sub-markets. Most 
consistent variables are Cash flow volatility and PREC that have positive and thus expected 
interaction term with Issue for each sub-sample. R&D x Issue has positive (but insignificant) 
coefficient only for the Nordics sub-sample and other sub-samples have against-expected and 
negative coefficient for the interaction term. Moreover, Dividends x Issue has negative 
coefficient for all other samples but Nordic, which further suggests that Nordic countries 
differ from central European countries when it comes to precautionary motive – share 
issuance interaction. Still, the main conclusion is that PREC x Issue coefficients are positive 
for each sub-sample and thus Hypothesis 4 is supported. To summarize, usage of R&D and 
Dividends as precautionary proxies should be argued with caution and considering the 
characteristics of the sample. Furthermore, Cash flow volatility seems to be the most 
consistent variable of the three proxies. Finally, construction of the first principal component 
PREC succeeds apparently well in capturing the common precautionary motive in each proxy. 
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This is because PREC is able to produce similar results for each sub-sample regardless 
varying result within two out of three individual precautionary proxies.  
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6.6. Primary Motivation for Share Issuances 
 
Results discussed earlier in the empirical part of the thesis have shown that firms have 
increasingly been saving cash received from share issuances during sample period and that 
within-firm increases in precautionary motives cause within-firm increases in share issuance – 
cash savings. In Section 6.3.1, I reported that during the whole sample period, firms saved on 
average 40.4% of their issuance proceeds as cash and peak value for cash savings was as high 
as 54.9% in 2005. Next, I further investigate the main motivation for share issuances. More 
specifically, I test whether firms issue shares primarily for investment purposes and after that 
issue extra shares to generate precautionary cash savings; or is the primary motivation for 
share issuances the purpose of cash savings. I further emphasize that other motives for equity 
issuances, such as market timing explanation (see Kim and Weisbach, 2008), are left out of 
the scope of this thesis. Moreover, measures constructed next following McLean (2011) result 
in simplified explanations for equity issuance motives and more sophisticated proxies would 
be in order to more thoroughly investigate this topic.  
Three different measures in order to investigate motives for equity issuance are constructed 
following McLean (2011). Sample includes now all firms that have positive Issue values 
during sample period 1995 – 2010, i.e. non-issuers are excluded. First measure is Cash-Issue, 
which is simply cash at the beginning of the year minus share issuance cash proceeds during 
the financial year. Thus, if a firm has a positive value for Cash-Issue, it means that the firm 
would have had positive cash balance at the end of the year even with a full usage of received 
share issuance proceeds during the year. Negative Cash-Issue on the other hand indicates that 
the firm would have run out of cash if it had been forced to spend all issuance proceeds during 
financial year, and consequently the main motivation for share issuance would have been 
investment purposes instead of cash savings. 
Second measure is Abnormal investment, which is this financial year’s investment, i.e. the 
sum of R&D, capital expenditures and cash-financed acquisitions scaled by lagged total 
assets, minus the average yearly investment for the firm during the entire sample period. 
Thus, because average yearly investment is calculated from entire period, it includes also the 
years when firm did not issue shares. Consequently, if a firm had a positive Abnormal 
investment during the issuance year, then it might be that investment played some role in 
firm’s share issuance decision. But as discussed in previous paragraph, it might have been 
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possible for the firm to finance its investment and operations even with Abnormal investment 
being positive if Cash-Issue that year has been positive. 
 
Table 12 Tests for Primary Share Issuance Motive 
Table reports results of the motivations for share issuance using three different measures. Sample includes only 
the firms with non-zero values for Issue. Cash-Issue is cash and cash equivalents minus cash proceeds from 
share issuance that year. Abnormal investment is firm’s yearly sum of cash investment (including R&D, capital 
expenditures and cash-financed acquisitions) divided by total assets, minus the firm’s average value of yearly 
cash  investment during the whole time period 1995 – 2010. Log(Issue/Investment) is the natural logarithm of 
share issuance proceeds divided by cash investment. Panel A reports the yearly average percentage of firm with 
Cash-Issue > 0, Abnormal investment > 0 and the mean value of Log(Issue/Investment). t-Statistic in Panel A 
shows whether means for Cash-Issue > 0 and Abnormal Investment > 0 are significantly different from 0.50. 
Panel B reports time trend tests for the three share issuance motive measures. Time trend coefficient is received 
by regressing each measure on a time variable and sufficient amount of lag terms in order to control for 
autoregression. t-Statistics are reported in parentheses. * = significant at 10%; ** = significant at 5%; and *** = 
significant at 1%. Durbin-Watson statistics are reported at the bottom of the table. The sample of non-zero 
issuers includes 16,433 firm-year observations during period 1995 – 2010. 
 
 
The final measure is the natural logarithm of share issuance proceeds scaled by investments, 
where investment is again the sum of R&D, capital expenditures and cash-financed 
acquisitions scaled by lagged total assets. As reported already in Section 6.3.1., share issuance 
Log(Issue/Inv.)
Mean 0.766*** -2.174
t-statistic (28.96) n/a
Time -0.004* 0.070**
(1.94) (2.29)
Intercept 0.796*** -2.574***
(44.98) (2.98)
Lag 1 0.081
(0.28)
Lag 2
Years 16 16
Durbin-Watson 1.41 1.92
-0.686***
(3.06)
16
2.06
Panel A: Mean values
Panel B: Time trends
(1.01)
0.402***
(3.23)
0.988***
(4.28)
% of firms with Cash - 
Issue > 0
% of firms with 
Abnorm. investm. > 0
0.505
(0.2)
-0.005
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– cash savings perceived an increase during the sample period 1995 – 2006. Therefore, 
Log(Issue/Investment) should have also increased over time as the portion of shares issued for 
investment purposes should have been declining. In this sense, Log(Issue/Investment) acts as a 
robustness test for increased share issuance – cash savings findings.  
Average yearly percentage of issuers that have positive values of Cash-Issue and Abnormal 
investment are reported in Panel A of Table 12. Result shows that 76.6% of issuers have 
Cash-Issue values greater than zero. Therefore, approximately three out of four issuers within 
sample period could have been able to finance their operations and investments also without 
the use of share issuance proceeds. This result strongly supports the hypothesis that cash 
savings would be the primary motivation for share issuances over investment motivation.  
Panel A further reports that 50.5% of firms had abnormal investments during the year of 
issuance. T-statistic of 0.2 indicates that this figure does not statistically differ from 50%, i.e. 
half of the issuers had abnormal investments during issue year, and other half had lower-than-
average investments at the same year. Combined with the result received from Cash-Issue 
calculation, I conclude that issuers are not characterized with particularly high investments 
but operations and investments would have been able to be financed with current cash 
savings. Therefore, cash savings, compared to investment motive, has been the primary 
motive for share issuances.  
Panel B in Table 12 reports time trends for each measure
16
. Negative time trend coefficient 
for Cash-Issue shows that more firms have been conducting share issuances larger than their 
current cash savings towards the end of the time period. However, decrease in average figure 
is mainly due to rather steep decrease in the 1990s. Average amount of positive Cash-Issue 
issuers was 82.9% in 1995 and decreased to 67.5% by 2000. On the other hand, measure gave 
average percentages of 77.3% and 76.0% in 2001 and 2010, respectively (not reported). 
Therefore, firms have not lately been increasing the size of issues when compared to current 
cash holdings. Trend for issuers with Abnormal investments is also negative but statistically 
insignificant. Time trend for Log(Issue/Investment) is positive and significant at 5% level, 
which supports the earlier findings that firms have been investing decreasing portion of their 
issuance proceeds and used increasing portion to precautionary cash savings.  
                                                 
16
 Unlike other time trend tests in the thesis, I use here the sample period which includes also the years of the 
recent financial crisis. This is because sample includes only issuing firms and financial crisis did not seem to 
deteriorate time trends in unreported tests. Tests were run for each measure also for time period 1995 – 2006 and 
they don´t significantly differ from results reported in Table 12. 
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7. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
The purpose of this study was to investigate the connection between precautionary cash 
savings and share issuances. Grounding for this thesis is based on two recent research papers 
that both have contributed to previous literature on many levels, and mainly focusing on the 
precautionary motive on cash holdings. First one by Bates, Kahle and Stulz (2009) reports 
that cash ratios have more than doubled for industrial firms during last three decades. The 
second primary research paper followed in this thesis is by McLean (2011) who shows that 
firms are increasingly saving equity issuance proceeds. The connection between these two 
papers lies within the argument that namely precautionary motives have been driving the 
increase in cash ratios and that intense share issuance – cash savings are a result for higher 
need of precautionary cash savings. My contribution to existing literature is to use European 
dataset in order to investigate whether similar conclusions can be done for a more diverse 
market. Usage of data from EU15 countries enables to conclude whether hypotheses are 
supported in general when sample includes countries with different characteristics.  
Dataset used in empirical part of this thesis included all active and non-active publicly listed 
firms in EU15 countries in period 1995 – 2010. In addition, a sub-period of 1995 – 2006 was 
widely used to exclude the effects of recent financial crisis on time trends. Main variables 
used in empirical tests included four proxies for precautionary motives (i.e. industry cash flow 
volatility, R&D expenditures, dividend payments, and their first principal component) and 
four proxies for internal and external cash sources (i.e. debt issuance, equity issuance, 
operational cash flow and non-operational cash flow).   
Primary dependent variable used in the regressions was ΔCash as my principal aim was to 
investigate the effect of different precautionary and cash source proxies on cash savings. 
Moreover, time trends for theses proxies were statistically tested in order to estimate whether 
share issuances and precautionary motive measures had similar development that would 
create evidence for potential unit roots during sample period. Finally, firm- and year-fixed 
regression model was used in order to investigate within-firm effect of interaction between 
precautionary motives and share issuances on cash savings.  
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7.1. Empirical Conclusions 
 
I find that European firms have significantly increased their cash ratios during period 1995 – 
2006 as the average cash ratio in 2006 is almost 50% higher than respective figure in 1995. In 
addition, I observe a significant increasing time trend for median cash ratios for this time 
period which concludes that firms have constantly been increasing their cash holdings on 
average. The increase in cash holding has further decreased the level of net debt within my 
sample as I conclude that, together with increasing cash ratios, firms have kept their leverage 
more or less fixed.  
In order to conclude the presence of precautionary cash holdings, I examine how the scope of 
different precautionary proxies interacts with cash holdings. The general result is that firms 
within highest quintile of each precautionary proxy – Cash flow volatility, R&D, Dividends 
and PREC – have dramatically higher average cash ratios than their counterparties on the 
lowest quintile. This conclusion is especially strong for PREC, which is the first principal 
component of Cash flow volatility, R&D and Dividends. In other words, increase in PREC at 
lower quintiles does not have strong effect on cash holdings, but as PREC increases to highest 
quintile, it has very strong positive effect on cash holdings.   
Traditionally, firms have thought to use equity issuance to finance their investments. 
However, I find supporting evidence for McLean’s (2011) findings by concluding that share 
issuances are the primary source for cash savings. First, savings rate for Issue is clearly higher 
compared to other sources, i.e. Debt, Cash flow and Other. Second, firms raise roughly the 
same amount of capital from Issue, Debt and Cash flow on average. Finally, the conclusion is 
that the amount of cash saved from share issuances is clearly higher than from any other cash 
source. Moreover, I find that cash savings retrieved from equity issuance proceeds are 
persistent, i.e. they are not used for ear-marked investments in following years of the 
issuance. More specifically, when it comes to investment motive in context of equity 
issuance, I find stronger support for the motive that shares are issued for precautionary cash 
savings purposes rather than for financing investments. 
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Table 13 Summary of Empirical Results 
Table reports the empirical findings and conclusions for each hypothesis presented in Section 3.  
Hypothesis
H1A European firms have increased 
their cash ratios during time 
period 1995-2006.
H1B Firms have decreased their net 
debt levels during the sample 
period 1995-2006.
H2 Firms with highest 
precautionary motives have 
highest cash ratios.
H3 Share issuances are the main 
source for cash savings. 
H4 Within-firm increases in 
precautionary motives cause 
increases in within-firm share 
issuance - cash savings. 
H5 Cash savings is the main 
motive for share issuances. 
Moderate support. Cash-Issue  measure supports the hypothesis as 76.6% of issuers had a Cash-Issue  larger than zero 
during the period 1995 - 2010. Abnormal Investment  >0 measure was not significantly different from 50%. Therefore, half 
of the issuers had larger-than-average investments during the year of share issuance. Thus, results received from 
Abnormal Investment measure don't bring additional evidence for hypothesis.
Empirical Evidence
Strong support. Average cash ratio has increased by 48.7% from 1995 to 2006. Median cash ratio has increased by 26% 
at the same time. Moreover, time trend for median cash ratio is stastically significant at 10% level even with a rather short 
time period. Cash ratios have increased most for small firms, non-dividend payers, negative income firms and firms with 
highest PREC.
Strong support. Average net leverage has decreased by 69.1% from 1995 to 2006. Median net leverage has decreased by 
35.6% at the same time. In addition, time trend for average net leverage is negative and statistically significant at 10% level. 
Net debt has increased most for smallest firms. Decrease in net debt is due to increased cash ratios and steady leverage 
levels during the period.
Moderate support. This holds most of the times. However, firms with highest Cash flow volatility  don't always hold 
highest cash ratios. In addition, hypthesis suggests that highest dividend payers should hold least cash, which is not the case. 
When comparing only dividend-payers and non-dividend payers, the hypothesis holds. For R&D  and PREC , hypothesis 
receives strong support.
Strong support. The average savings rate from Issue  was 0.404 during period 1995 - 2010. Rates for Debt, Cash flow 
and Other  were, -0.021; 0.172; and 0.153, respectively. At the same time, firms used Issue  for capital raising 
approximately as much as they used Debt  and Cash flow . Subsequently, average amount of cash saved (scaled by assets) 
from Issue  during the period was 0.027. This is more than firms saved from Debt, Cash flow  and Other  together.
Moderate support. Hypothesis holds for interaction between Cash flow volatility  x Issue , R&D x Issue , and PREC x 
Issue . Namely, within-firm increases in these precautionary motives cause within-firm increases in share issuance-cash 
savings. Result for interaction between Dividends x Issue  was unexpected: within-firm dividend payments and within-firm 
share issuance-cash savings had positive (although insignificant) relation when the theory suggests that the relation should 
be negative.
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The interaction between each precautionary motive proxy and Issue is tested in firm- and year-fixed 
regression model. I conclude that within-firm increase in precautionary motives cause within-firm 
increase in share issuance – cash savings. However, the results are not as expected for each 
precautionary proxy as Dividends does not seem to have similar effect on share issuance – cash 
savings as would be expected according to theoretical framework of the thesis. Thus, the usability 
of Dividends as a precautionary motive proxy is questioned and its additional value in explaining 
firm’s total precautionary motive for cash holdings receives ambiguous support. After running 
robustness checks for four different sub-markets, I conclude that Cash flow volatility is the most 
consistent individual proxy for precautionary cash holdings. In addition, construction of the first 
principal component works well when several proxies (that are expected to have both precautionary 
component and component that is not relevant) are used to capture firm’s total precautionary motive 
for cash holdings.  
All tested hypotheses and corresponding empirical main findings are presented in Table 13 on 
previous page. 
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APPENDICES 
 
 
Appendix 1 Summary Statistics by Sample Country 
Country-specific mean values for main variables defined in Table 2. In addition, euro-denominated statistics for Total 
Assets and Cash are presented in order to depict the size of sample firms. Sample consists of 3,876 unique companies 
during time period 1995 – 2010 with total of 41,144 firm year observations.  
 
 
N Cash ratio Δ Cash Issue Debt Cash flow Other
Austria 730 0.155 0.037 0.030 0.016 0.078 0.026
Belgium 1,100 0.135 0.032 0.041 0.024 0.088 0.031
Denmark 1,240 0.177 0.026 0.051 0.022 0.071 0.025
Finland 1,327 0.148 0.022 0.026 0.045 0.102 0.018
France 6,903 0.155 0.038 0.032 0.029 0.078 0.018
Germany 6,892 0.168 0.051 0.048 0.024 0.062 0.049
Greece 2,686 0.083 0.016 0.014 0.025 0.065 0.015
Ireland 581 0.214 0.046 0.108 0.036 0.040 0.003
Italy 2,165 0.130 0.034 0.034 0.018 0.057 0.025
Luxembourg 225 0.126 0.049 0.043 0.061 0.091 0.009
Netherlands 1,492 0.132 0.031 0.060 0.043 0.093 0.021
Portugal 618 0.062 0.015 0.020 0.108 0.069 0.026
Spain 1,069 0.095 0.019 0.014 0.029 0.090 0.015
Sweden 2,806 0.188 0.048 0.089 0.019 0.032 0.021
UK 11,310 0.183 0.042 0.115 0.036 0.031 0.015
Total Sample 41,144 0.151 0.038 0.062 0.030 0.058 0.028
CF vol. Dividends R&D PREC
Assets 
(Log) Cash (M€)
Assets 
(M€)
Austria -2.756 0.012 0.018 -0.136 19.164 95.192 984.958
Belgium -2.542 0.014 0.017 0.077 19.084 81.213 1173.171
Denmark -2.627 0.014 0.025 0.095 18.575 82.222 776.220
Finland -2.685 0.034 0.031 -0.174 19.058 136.301 1173.326
France -2.600 0.011 0.014 0.031 18.585 237.799 2430.717
Germany -2.607 0.012 0.018 0.059 18.441 209.557 2316.922
Greece -2.737 0.013 0.003 -0.298 18.466 26.156 296.638
Ireland -2.553 0.010 0.016 0.068 18.984 165.030 1181.470
Italy -2.631 0.012 0.006 -0.122 19.539 256.383 2532.397
Luxembourg -2.459 0.023 0.002 -0.126 20.179 303.143 3877.086
Netherlands -2.639 0.018 0.015 -0.092 19.407 398.044 4132.424
Portugal -2.828 0.011 0.000 -0.414 19.435 86.596 1130.493
Spain -2.650 0.015 0.003 -0.226 19.899 247.406 3255.352
Sweden -2.568 0.019 0.023 0.075 18.215 109.079 937.800
UK -2.537 0.018 0.021 0.085 18.280 116.559 1387.893
Total Sample -2.601 0.015 0.017 0.000 18.624 1023.966 168.158
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Appendix 2 t-Statistics for Differences in New Issues, Dividend Status and Accounting 
Performance Sub-Samples 
Table reports t-statistics for yearly differences in the average cash ratios between new issues, dividend status and 
accounting performance sub-groups (figures reported in Table 6). * = significant at 10%; ** = significant at 5%; and 
*** = significant at 1%. Firm is assigned to IPO subsample if it has executed its initial public offering within prior five 
calendar years and to Non-IPO subsample otherwise. Firm is assigned to Dividend Payer subsample if it paid common 
dividend during financial year and to Non-Dividend Payer subsample otherwise. A firm is classified by accounting 
performance to negative and non-negative income firms by its net income. Sample consists of 41,144 firm year 
observations during the period 1995 -2010. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Year IPO Firms
Non-IPO 
Firms
Dividend 
Payer
Non-Dividend 
Payer
Negative 
Income Firms
Non-Negative 
Income Firms
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010 (2.44)**
(6.70)***
(5.70)***
(3.76)***
(3.36)***
(3.12)***
(3.42)***
(3.97)***
(6.00)***
(2.82)***
(6.83)***
(5.02)***
(3.94)***
(3.45)***
(5.08)***
(5.49)***
(6.68)***
(5.32)***
(4.12)***
(3.61)***
(5.18)***
(5.81)***
(1.20)
(3.29)***
(0.49)
(1.27)
(2.65)***
(3.04)***
(4.27)***
(7.43)***
(6.25)***
(5.33)***
(4.85)***
(5.33)***
(6.46)***
(7.10)***
(4.96)***
(4.60)***
(4.76)***
(2.24)**
(1.99)**
(3.76)***
(6.50)***
(6.53)***
         New Issues              Dividend Status          Accounting Performance     
(1.13)
(1.89)*
(0.44)
(1.98)**
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Appendix 3 Precautionary Motives and Share Issuance – Cash Savings: Tests for Selected 
Countries 
Table reports results for firms in France, Germany, UK and Nordics from firm- and year-fixed effects for the following 
regression model 
ΔCashi = αi + at + β1 Issueit + β2 Debtit + β3 Cash flowit + β4 Otherit + β5 Assetsit +β6 PrecProxyit + βn PrecProxyit x 
Issueit + εit ,  
where αi represents each firm’s own intercept. Issue is cash proceeds from share issuances divided by lagged total 
assets. Debt is cash proceeds from additional debt divided by lagged total assets. Cash flow is net income plus 
amortization and depreciation divided by lagged total assets. Other includes all other cash sources, including the sales 
of assets and investments, divided by lagged total assets. Assets is natural logarithm of lagged total assets. PrecProxy 
stands for precautionary motives: Cash flow volatility, Dividends, R&D and PREC. . Cash flow volatility is the average 
cash flow volatility within each firm’s two-digit SIC code, measured over the past five years (at least three years). 
Dividends is paid common dividends divided by lagged total assets.  R&D is research and development expenditures 
divided by lagged total assets. PREC is the first principal component of Cash flow volatility, Dividends and R&D. 
PrecProxy x Issue is an interaction term between a precautionary motive proxy and Issue. Standard errors are estimated 
by clustering on firm. t-Statistics are reported in parentheses. * = significant at 10%; ** = significant at 5%; and *** = 
significant at 1%. Panel A reports results for France with 4,695 observations during period 1995 – 2006. Panel B reports 
results for Germany with 4,840 observations during period 1995 – 2006. Panel C reports results for UK with 7,280 
observations during period 1995 – 2006. Panel D reports results for Nordic EU15 countries including Denmark, Finland 
and Sweden with 3,539 observations during period 1995 – 2006. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Issue 0.555*** 1.517*** 0.456*** 0.950*** 0.477***
(8.08) (2.84) (4.57) (4.15) (9.02)
Debt 0.134* 0.226*** 0.177** 0.493** 0.148**
(1.90) (2.63) (2.25) (2.43) (2.08)
Cash Flow -0.157 0.236 0.367*** 0.288*** -0.172
(0.35) (1.45) (2.66) (2.93) (0.36)
Other 0.230 0.473 0.121 -0.056 0.235
(1.06) (1.01) (0.50) (0.12) (1.06)
Assets 0.004 0.024 0.015 0.068** 0.003
(0.31) (1.37) (1.02) (2.26) (0.28)
CF Vol -0.000
(0.02)
CF Vol x Issue 0.389*
(1.69)
Dividends -0.743*
(1.67)
Div x Issue -2.493
(0.50)
R&D 0.042
(0.07)
R&D x Issue -0.765
(0.67)
PREC 0.025
(1.12)
PREC x Issue 0.132***
(3.65)
R
2
0.13 0.31 0.24 0.01 0.13
Panel A: France
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Issue 0.519*** 1.268*** 0.842*** 0.450*** 0.518***
(3.92) (4.00) (21.64) (3.60) (4.02)
Debt (-0.058 0.088 -0.169** -0.733** -0.066
(0.70) (0.38) (1.98) (1.96) (0.76)
Cash Flow 0.072 0.110 0.110 -0.986 0.031
(0.60) (0.56) (0.63) (1.54) (0.49)
Other 0.207 -0.239 0.433 0.449 0.783
(1.61) (0.56) (1.04) (0.79) (1.38)
Assets 0.024 0.035 0.218* 0.017
(0.70) (0.83) (1.81) (1.29)
CF Vol -0.032
(0.87)
CF Vol x Issue 0.256**
(2.22)
Dividends -0.427
(1.17)
Div x Issue -4.018***
(5.47)
R&D 4.233
(1.56)
R&D x Issue -3.841**
(2.53)
PREC -0.039***
(2.93)
PREC x Issue 0.003
(0.13)
R
2
0.21 0.65 (0.59) 0.25 0.21
Panel B: Germany
87 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Issue 0.243*** 0.917* 1.825 0.207*** 0.232**
(3.11) (1.64) (1.63) (7.17) (2.46)
Debt -0.094 -0.005 0.033 0.309 -0.086
(0.61) (0.02) (0.13) (1.48) (0.46)
Cash Flow 0.039 0.088 0.159 0.160 -0.031
(0.21) (0.56) (1.50) (0.73) (0.13)
Other -0.211 0.586 0.351 -3.537** -0.165
(0.26) (0.91) (0.96) (2.56) (0.19)
Assets 0.044 -0.022 -0.013 0.090** 0.056
(1.08) (0.86) (0.79) (2.46) (1.19)
CF Vol 0.090*
(1.65)
CF Vol x Issue 0.262
(1.22)
Dividends -1.416**
(2.08)
Div x Issue -59.831
(1.08)
R&D 0.857
(1.45)
R&D x Issue -1.160***
(2.77)
PREC 0.008
(0.26)
PREC x Issue 0.081
(0.72)
R
2
0.05 0.43 0.15 0.01 0.04
Panel C: UK
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Issue 0.493*** 0.503*** 0.101 0.273 0.433***
(6.13) (4.20) (1.45) (1.25) (5.28)
Debt -0.104* 0.077 0.144** -0.009 -0.093
(1.84) (1.34) (1.97) (0.09) (1.60)
Cash Flow 0.190 0.130 0.640*** 0.420** 0.122
(1.49) (1.47) (5.11) (2.11) (0.87)
Other 0.529** 0.386 0.073 -0.194 0.415*
(2.27) (1.53) (0.18) (0.26) (1.90)
Assets 0.004 0.007 0.008 -0.062* 0.008
(0.31) (0.50) (0.50) (1.69) (0.61)
CF Vol -0.082**
(2.51)
CF Vol x Issue 0.025
(0.74)
Dividends -0.482**
(2.14)
Div x Issue 4.83***
(3.10)
R&D 0.171
(0.79)
R&D x Issue 0.765
(1.52)
PREC -0.030*
(1.65)
PREC x Issue 0.078***
(2.72)
R
2
0.22 0.63 0.26 0.193 0.18
Panel D: Denmark, Finland and Sweden
